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Corpus Linguistics and the Dream of Objectivity
Evan C. Zoldan*
A growing number of scholars and judges have embraced corpus
linguistics as a way to interpret legal texts. Their stated goal—to make
legal interpretation more objective—is an admirable one. But, is their
claim that corpus linguistics reduces the subjectivity associated with
judicial intuition and biased data more than just a dream? After analyzing
the way that corpus linguistics is used to interpret statutes, this Article
concludes that corpus linguistics does not live up to its promise to make
legal interpretation more objective. Instead, the use of corpus linguistics to
interpret statutes results in interpretations that are radically acontextual,
disrupting its proponents’ dream of objectivity.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The notion of objectivity in legal interpretation carries great rhetorical
force. It evokes a world in which judges are neutral, dispassionate, and all
but invisible in the contests they judge.1 In a well-known statement made
during his Senate confirmation hearing, then-Judge John Roberts invoked
this vision of objectivity when he declared that “Judges are like umpires.
Umpires don’t make the rules, they apply them . . . . [A]nd I will
remember that it’s my job to call balls and strikes, and not to pitch or bat.”2
Not all legal thinkers express such optimism about the prospect that a legal
interpreter can remain separated from an interpretation. More modestly,
1

See Charles Fried, Balls and Strikes, 61 EMORY L.J. 641 (2012).
Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice
of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 55–56
(2005) (statement of John G. Roberts).
2

ZOLDAN (DO NOT DELETE)

2019]

11/15/2019 6:03 PM

THE DREAM OF OBJECTIVITY

403

Professor Kent Greenawalt suggests, it is inevitable that the interpreter’s
perspective will be incorporated into an interpretation; nevertheless, a
community’s shared language and culture means that “questions about
meaning can often be answered with confidence, that an answer can be
objectively right or wrong.”3 For Professor Owen Fiss, objectivity
connotes standards, implying that “an interpretation can be measured
against a set of norms that transcend the particular vantage point of the
person offering the interpretation.”4
These visions of objectivity differ; but in each one, interpretive
objectivity means not merely signposts for legal interpreters, but also
fences to corral their interpretations. It is the desire to constrain the
interpreter that is the dream of objectivity: an objective interpretation
reduces the role of the legal interpreter in the interpretive process by
limiting the range of permissible interpretations.5
It is with this dream of objectivity that some legal interpreters have
embraced corpus linguistics methods to interpret legal texts. Corpus
linguistics, a methodology or set of tools for studying language data in
bodies of text,6 is not a new discipline. What is new is the use of corpus
linguistics to interpret legal texts, like statutes and the Constitution.
Asserting that statutory interpretation often calls on the interpreter to find
the “ordinary meaning” of a text, users of corpus linguistics methods seek
meaning in bodies of text, called corpora, that they claim reflect the
ordinary usage of those words. Although some corpus users acknowledge
the role that the interpreter’s judgment plays in interpretation, the dream of
objectivity is the rallying cry of corpus linguistics for legal interpretation.
Indeed, corpus users frame the utility of corpus linguistics techniques in
terms of a critique of other methods of interpretation, which are often
derided as “simple cherry-picking,”7 “subjective,”8 or “idiosyncratic.”9 In
3

KENT GREENAWALT, LAW AND OBJECTIVITY 74 (1992).
Owen Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739, 744–45 (1982).
See also RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE viiix (1986) (insisting that “in most hard cases
there are right answers,” even if those right answers cannot be proved to be correct); id. at
255–56 (arguing that a community’s history and political principles are objective facts that
provide outer bounds on the subjectivity of legal interpretation); Ronald Dworkin, No Right
Answer?, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 30–31 (1978).
5
Ofer Raban, Between Formalism and Conservatism: The Resurgent Legal
Formalism of the Roberts Court, 8 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 343, 368 (2014).
6
GRAEME KENNEDY, AN INTRODUCTION TO CORPUS LINGUISTICS 1 (2014). Krzysztof
Kredens & Malcolm Coulthard, Corpus Linguistics in Authorship Identification, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LANGUAGE AND LAW 504–05 (Peter M. Tiersma & Lawrence M.
Solan eds., 2016) (noting different definitions of “corpus” and “corpus linguistics”).
7
Thomas R. Lee & Stephen C. Mouritsen, Judging Ordinary Meaning, 127 YALE L.J.
807 (2018).
8
James C. Phillips, Daniel M. Ortner & Thomas R. Lee, Corpus Linguistics &
Original Public Meaning: A New Tool to Make Originalism More Empirical, 126 Yale
4
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contrast, some corpus users claim that corpus linguistics can “help us
deliver on the promise of an objective inquiry.”10
Corpus users’ criticisms of other methods of interpretation have been
persuasive to a small but growing group of judges who have adopted, to
various degrees, corpus linguistics methods in their opinions. These
methods have been used most consistently, and explained most thoroughly,
by the Supreme Court of Utah’s Justice Lee, an early judicial adopter of
corpus methods.11 In the first adoption by a state high court, the Supreme
Court of Michigan relied explicitly on corpus linguistics methods to
interpret a state statute.12 Importantly, corpus linguistics methods have
spread from state courts to federal courts. A federal district court relied in
part on corpus methods when interpreting a term of the Federal Credit
Union Act, using data from a corpus search alongside a Westlaw search,
dictionaries, and canons of construction.13 In a pair of Court of Appeals
opinions interpreting provisions of ERISA, judges of the Third Circuit14
and the Sixth Circuit15 have relied on corpus data as well. And most
notably, Justice Thomas cited data returned by a corpus search in his
dissent in Carpenter v. United States.16 So, too, has the scholarly
community begun to take notice. Building on the recent burst of judicial
uses of corpus linguistics, legal scholarship has begun working out the
possibilities of this new methodology.17 All of this suggests that corpus
L.J.F. 21, 23–24 (2016) (arguing that corpus linguistics sometimes can “rescue” originalism
from subjectivity). See also Stephen C. Mouritsen, Hard Cases and Hard Data, 13 COLUM.
SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 156, 202 (2011) (“Thus, the corpus method embodies the
lexicographer’s proud ideal of descriptive objectivity; his citations (and interpretations of
them) are publicly verifiable.”) (internal citations omitted).
9
Stefan Th. Gries & Brian G. Slocum, Ordinary Meaning and Corpus Linguistics,
2017 BYU L. REV. 1417, 1441 (2017).
10
Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 7, at 796.
11
State v. Rasabout, 356 P.3d 1258, 1274 (Utah 2015) (Lee, J., concurring); In re
Adoption of Baby E.Z., 266 P.3d 702, 72527 (Utah 2011) (Lee, J., concurring).
12
People v. Harris, 885 N.W.2d 832, 838–39 (Mich. 2016).
13
Am. Bankers Ass’n v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 306 F. Supp. 3d 44, 68 (D.D.C.
2018).
14
Caesars Entm’t Corp. v. Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs, 932 F.3d 91, 95 (3d Cir.
2019).
15
Wilson v. Safelite Grp., Inc., 930 F.3d 429, 439, 440 (6th Cir. 2019) (Thapar, J.,
concurring).
16
Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2238 (2018) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
17
E.g., Anya Bernstein, Democratizing Interpretation, 60 WM. & MARY L. REV. 435
(2018); Clark D. Cunningham & Jesse Egbert, Scientific Methods for Analyzing Original
Meaning: Corpus Linguistics and the Emoluments Clause (Ga. St. Univ. Coll. Law, Legal
Studies Research Paper No. 2019-02, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstra
ct id=3321438; J.S. Ehrett, Against Corpus Linguistics, 108 GEO. L. J. ONLINE (2019); Gries
& Slocum, supra note 9, at 1434; Ethan Herenstein, The Faulty Frequency Hypothesis, 70
STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 112, 116-119 (2017); Carissa Byrne Hessick, Corpus Linguistics and
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linguistics methods are increasingly relevant to interpretive theory. As a
result, the time has come to examine whether corpus linguistics can deliver
on its promise of interpretive constraints.
After examining the theory and practice of corpus use for the purposes
of statutory interpretation, this Article concludes that, despite its allure,
corpus linguistics does not bring legal interpretation closer to fulfilling the
dream of objectivity. Part II introduces the discipline of corpus linguistics
and describes how it is used by legal scholars and judges to interpret
statutes. Part III sets out the case for objectivity made by proponents of
corpus linguistics for statutory interpretation. It first describes corpus
users’ criticisms of the subjectivity of other methods of interpretation,
specifically, the subjectivity that flows from the interpreter’s reliance on
her own intuition and on biased data. Next, it describes the ways in which
some corpus users believe that corpus linguistics techniques reduce the
subjectivity associated with intuition and biased data.
Part IV analyzes corpus linguistics methods to determine whether they
do, in fact, reduce the subjectivity of the interpretive process. Despite the
claims of its proponents, corpus users introduce subjectivity into the
interpretive process at the moment they choose a corpus to search. This
subjective decision determines the final interpretive outcome, disrupting
corpus users’ dream of objectivity. Part V compares the subjectivity of
corpus linguistics methods to the subjectivity corpus users criticize in other
methods of interpretation. Strikingly, the subjectivity of corpus use rests
also on the interpreter’s intuition and on biased data, undermining the claim
that corpus linguistics is superior to other methods of interpretation.
This Article makes three main contributions to the literature on corpus
linguistics and legal interpretation. First, this Article contests the central
claim made by users of corpus linguistics for statutory interpretation,
the Criminal Law, 2017 BYU L. REV. 1503, 1508–09 (2017); Jennifer L. Mascott, The
Dictionary as a Specialized Corpus, 2017 BYU L. REV. 1557 (2017) [hereinafter Mascott,
Dictionary]; Jennifer L. Mascott, Who Are Officers of the United States?, 70 STAN. L. REV.
443, 496 (2018) [hereinafter Mascott, Officers]; Phillips et al., supra note 8, at 24–26; James
Cleith Phillips & Sara White, The Meaning of the Three Emoluments Clauses in the U.S.
Constitution, 59 S. TEX. L. REV. 181 (2019); Brian G. Slocum, Ordinary Meaning and
Empiricism, 40 STAT. L. Rev. 13 (2019); Lawrence M. Solan, Legal Linguistics in the U.S.:
Looking Back, Looking Ahead (Brook. L. Sch., Legal Studies Paper No. 609, 2019),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers/cfm?abstract_id=3428489; Lawrence M. Solan &
Tammy Gales, Corpus Linguistics as a Tool in Legal Interpretation, 2017 BYU L. REV.
1311, 1332; Lawrence B. Solum, Intellectual History as Constitutional Theory, 101 VA. L.
REV. 1111, 1135–36 (2015) (arguing that corpus linguistics is appropriate for the
investigation of semantic meaning of constitutional text because the Constitution, for
historical reasons, is “directed to the public at large”); Lee J. Strang, How Big Data
Increases Originalism’s Methodological Rigor: Using Corpus Linguistics to Recover
Original Language Conventions, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1181 (2017) (suggesting extratextual analysis to determine parameters of corpus search).

ZOLDAN (DO NOT DELETE)

406

11/15/2019 6:03 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50:401

namely, that it constrains legal interpretation in a way that reduces
subjectivity in the interpretive process. By focusing on the subjective
choice of corpus that users of corpus methods must make, this Article
concludes that corpus use is no more objective than the methods of
interpretation criticized by corpus users themselves.
Second, previous work on corpus linguistics methods generally do not
distinguish between the use of these methods for statutory interpretation
and their use in constitutional interpretation. This Article focuses on
statutory interpretation alone, analyzing corpus methods in light of the
legislative process and the unique nature of statutory language. In
particular, this Article describes the significant differences between
statutory language and nonlegal language. It concludes that searching for
legal meaning in a corpus of nonlegal language is particularly inappropriate
for statutory interpretation. Rather than simply serving as another “tool in
the toolbox” of statutory interpretation, corpus linguistics is different from
traditional tools of statutory interpretation because it leads to interpretations
that are radically acontextual.18
Third, previous work on corpus linguistics and interpretation has
suggested that the construction of a legal corpus might cure the defects that
flow from the mismatch between statutory language and nonlegal texts.
18

This Article does not address the use of corpus linguistics techniques in general, nor
does it suggest that corpus linguistics techniques are inappropriate in disciplines outside of
the context of statutory interpretation. Moreover, this Article does not address the use of
corpus linguistics for constitutional interpretation. Nevertheless, much of the work here
might be applicable to the question of constitutional interpretation as well. McGinnis and
Rappaport have argued that the Constitution is written in legal language, much as I argue
here that statutes are written in legal language. John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport,
The Constitution and the Language of the Law, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1321 (2018). By
contrast, other scholars have suggested that at least some constitutional terms are written in
ordinary language. Solum, supra note 17, at 1136. In her work interpreting the term
“Officers of the United States,” for example, Jennifer Mascott defended the decision to
search for the term “officer” as an ordinary term after first conducting an extensive extratextual analysis to determine whether the constitutional term was an ordinary term rather
than a term of art. Mascott, Officers, supra note 17, at 471–72. Mascott looked not only to
other clauses of the Constitution, but also to the Constitution’s drafting history, founding-era
debates, and preratification history. Mascott, Officers, supra note 17, at 471–79. Mascott’s
process follows the elaborate approach set out by Lee Strang, who suggested that corpus
research should normally be done only after parameters for the search are established
through the study of sources external to the text under consideration. Strang, supra note 17,
at 1208–09. Strang suggests, for example, that a “stable of possible language conventions”
can be gathered by searching case law, scholarship, and primary and secondary sources.
Strang, supra note 17, at 1207. See also John Mikhail, The Definition of Emolument in
English Language and Legal Dictionaries, 1523–1806 (forthcoming) (on file with
Georgetown Univ. Law Center). I take no position at this time whether any part of the
Constitution can be interpreted as if it were ordinary language. But, to the extent that
constitutional language is legal language, the arguments made in this Article also suggest
the inappropriateness of searching in a corpus of nonlegal language for constitutional
meaning.
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This Article anticipates different types of legal corpora that might be
constructed and demonstrates practical and theoretical difficulties that
make the objective use of a legal corpus for statutory interpretation
unlikely.
II. CORPUS LINGUISTICS AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
Corpus linguistics is a methodology or set of tools for studying
language data in bodies of text.19 Although the study of linguistic
information found in collections of text is not a new activity,20 corpus
linguistics has taken on new importance as electronic storage and retrieval
systems allow users to search bodies of text, or corpora, that cannot
feasibly be searched manually.21 This wealth of electronic data has opened
up new possibilities for researchers to find evidence of patterns of language
use.22 Corpus linguistics techniques are often used to determine how
frequently words are used, in what context they are used, and, when a word
has multiple shades of meaning, or senses, what other words tend to
collocate with each of a word’s senses.23 The word “deal,” for example,
has multiple senses, including to solve a problem (“deal with the
situation”), to cope (“deal with the tragedy”), and to engage in business
interactions (“deal with the supplier”).24 Analyzing how “deal” collocates
with the words around it can help an interpreter determine which sense of
deal is meant in a particular text.25
Corpus linguistics methods have proved enticing to legal interpreters,
some of whom have touted the ability of corpus analysis to minimize
subjectivity in textual interpretation.26 A growing number of scholars and
19
KENNEDY, supra note 6, at 1; Kredens & Coulthard, supra note 6, at 504–05 (noting
competing and overlapping definitions of corpus linguistics); TONY MCENERY & ANDREW
HARDIE, CORPUS LINGUISTICS: METHOD, THEORY, AND PRACTICE 1–2 (2012) (noting that
corpus linguistics is still a rapidly developing field and that, as a result, its methods and
definitions are contested).
20
KENNEDY, supra note 6, at 1; DOUGLAS BIBER ET AL., CORPUS LINGUISTICS:
INVESTIGATING LANGUAGE STRUCTURE AND USE 21–22 (1998).
21
BIBER ET AL., supra note 20, at 22–23; KENNEDY, supra note 6, at 1; Peter M.
Tiersma & Lawrence M. Solan, Introduction in HANDBOOK OF LANGUAGE AND LAW 3
(2012).
22
BIBER ET AL., supra note 20, at 1–2.
23
Id. at at 23–25.
24
Id. at 42.
25
Id. at 42–43. Importantly, however, linguists recognize that there is not a perfect
correlation between collocation and usage of a word. Rather, a “single collocation can be
used with a range of senses.” BIBER ET AL., supra note 20, at 43. See also George Miller,
Contextuality, in MENTAL MODELS IN COGNITIVE SCIENCE 2–3 (1996) (discussing
polysemy).
26
State v. Rasabout, 356 P.3d 1258, 127475 (Utah 2015) (Lee, J., concurring)
(arguing that corpus linguistics is intended to ameliorate judicial intuition); Utah v. J.M.S.,
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judges have turned to corpus linguistics techniques when searching for the
original public meaning of the text of the Constitution27 or the ordinary
meaning of statutes.28 Although there are a number of corpora with
different sets of texts, users of corpus linguistics methods for statutory
interpretation rely exclusively, or virtually so, on general corpora, that is,
corpora that contain a balance of different types of texts that are meant to
approximate ordinary speech.29 For example, the Corpus of Contemporary
American English (COCA) contains more than 560 million words that
come from a variety of sources, including transcriptions of spoken
language, fiction, popular magazines, newspaper articles, and academic
works.30
A recent case from the Supreme Court of Michigan is typical of the
way legal interpreters have relied on corpus linguistics techniques. In
Harris, a statute prohibited the state from using a law enforcement officer’s
disclosure of “any information” in a subsequent criminal proceeding
against the officer.31 Three officers made false statements in the course of
an internal investigation into their conduct. The state used these false
statements in a criminal proceeding against the officers on the theory that
“information” pertains only to accurate statements and, as a result, false
statements do not fall within the ambit of the statute.32 The court rejected
this argument, relying, in part, on data derived from the COCA.
280 P.3d 410, 419 n.3 (Utah 2011) (Lee, J., concurring) (arguing that corpus linguistics is
used to check imperfect judicial intuition); Mouritsen, supra note 8, at 175–78 (arguing that
judges tend to be idiosyncratic in their intuition about ordinary usage and therefore cannot
determine ordinary usage intuitively); D. Carolina Nuñez, War of the Words: Aliens,
Immigrants, Citizens, and the Language of Exclusion, 2014 BYU L. REV. 1517, 1521
(arguing that corpus linguistics is a more reliable guide to language use than native speaker
intuition); Phillips & White, supra note 17, at 18283.
27
Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2238 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Mascott,
Dictionary, supra note 17, at 1557; Mascott, Officers, supra note 17, at 496; Phillips, Ortner
& Lee, supra note 8, at 24–26; Phillips & White, supra note 17, at 183; Strang, supra note
17, at 1181.
28
Caesars Entm’t Corp. v. Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs, 932 F.3d 91, 95 (3d Cir.
2019); Wilson v. Safelite Grp., Inc., 930 F.3d 429, 440 (6th Cir. 2019) (Thapar, J.,
concurring); Am. Bankers Ass’n v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 306 F. Supp. 3d 44, 68
(D.D.C. 2018); People v. Harris, 885 N.W.2d 832 (Mich. 2016); Rasabout, 356 P.3d at 1274
(Lee, J., concurring); In re: Adoption of Baby E.Z., 266 P.3d 702, 724 n.23 (Utah 2011)
(Lee, J., concurring); Stephen Mouritsen, The Dictionary Is Not a Fortress, 2010 BYU L.
REV. 1915, 1956–57 (2010); Daniel Ortner, The Merciful Corpus: The Rule of Lenity,
Ambiguity, and Corpus Linguistics, 25 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 101, 123 (2016).
29
See e.g., Craig v. Provo City, 389 P.3d 423, 428 n.3 (Utah 2016); Baby E.Z., 266
P.3d at 724 n.23 (Lee, J. concurring in part); Mouritsen, supra note 28, at 1956; Ortner,
supra note 28, at 128–29.
30
CORPUS CONTEMPORARY AM. ENG., https://www.english-corpora.org/coca/ (last
visited Sept. 21, 2019).
31
Harris, 885 N.W.2d at 833.
32
Id. at 835.
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Examining the COCA to determine whether the word “information” is
commonly collocated with words denoting truth or falsity, the court found
that the word information is often used in close proximity with words that
denote both truth and falsity, like “accurate,” and “inaccurate.”33 The court
concluded that the ordinary meaning of information, as used in the statute,
includes both true and false information.34 As a result, the court interpreted
the statute to prohibit the use of even false statements against the officers.
III. CORPUS LINGUISTICS AND THE DREAM OF OBJECTIVITY
Although many users of corpus linguistics acknowledge that the
elimination of the judge from the interpretive process is impossible,35 its
strongest proponents see corpus linguistics as a way to help achieve the
dream of objectivity. Indeed, most often, they frame the utility of corpus
linguistics techniques in terms of a critique of other methods of
interpretation, which are often derided as “simple cherry-picking,” 36
“subjective,”37 or “idiosyncratic.”38 By contrast, corpus users have argued,
corpus linguistics techniques can “help us deliver on the promise of an
objective inquiry”39 by reducing the subjectivity that plagues the process of
legal interpretation.40 Corpus users’ criticisms of other methods of
statutory interpretation fall roughly into one of two categories. Some
interpretations, they argue, rely on the intuition of the interpreter rather
than data of language use.41 Other interpretations, they claim, rely on
sources of language data that are biased and, as a result, fail to reflect

33

Id. at 839.
Id. See also id. at 839 n.33. In a revealing passage, the dissent demonstrated that the
methodology employed by the court could support the opposite inference about the meaning
of “information.” Id. at 850 n.14 (Markman, J., dissenting in part).
35
See Gries & Slocum, supra note 9, at 1447; Mouritsen, supra note 8, at 203.
36
Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 7, at 807.
37
Phillips, Ortner & Lee, supra note 8, at 23–24 (arguing that corpus linguistics
sometimes can “rescue” originalism from subjectivity). See also Mouritsen, supra note 8, at
202 (“Thus, the corpus method embodies the lexicographer’s proud ideal of descriptive
objectivity; his citations (and interpretations of them) are publicly verifiable.”) (internal
citations omitted).
38
Gries & Slocum, supra note 9, at 1441.
39
Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 7, at 796.
40
See generally State v. Rasabout, 356 P.3d 1258, 1274 (Utah 2015) (Lee, J.,
concurring); State v. J.M.S., 280 P.3d 410, 419 n.3 (Utah 2011); In re Adoption of Baby
E.Z., 266 P.3d 702, 728 (Utah 2011) (Lee, J., concurring); Gries & Slocum, supra note 9, at
1441; Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 7, at 867; Mouritsen, supra note 8, at 175–78, 180;
Nuñez, supra note 26, at 1521; Phillips & White, supra note 17, at 187.
41
Rasabout, 356 P.3d at 1274 (Lee, J., concurring); J.M.S., 280 P.3d at 419 n.3; Gries
& Slocum, supra note 9, at 1441; Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 7, at 806; Mouritsen, supra
note 8, at 175–78; Nuñez, supra note 26, at 1521.
34
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actual language use.42 This Part identifies the two categories of subjectivity
criticized by corpus users and describes the ways in which corpus users
believe that corpus linguistics techniques reduce subjectivity.
Evaluating the claim that corpus techniques can reduce subjectivity
and help achieve objectivity is complicated by two facts. First, although
they use the language of “objectivity” and “subjectivity,” proponents of
corpus linguistics methods for statutory interpretation have so far declined
to define these terms consistently. Second, objectivity and subjectivity
have a number of different definitions. Without denying the diversity of
views on the topic, for the purposes of this Article, an interpretation is
objective if the mechanisms for arriving at it are free of bias and other
distorting factors that obscure the interpretation.43 As a corollary, an
interpretation is objective if the process for reaching it is “reliably
constrained by effective rules, procedures, or goals.”44 Conversely, an
interpretation is subjective if it is not objective; that is, if bias or other
distorting factors obscure the interpretation or if the interpretation is
unconstrained by effective rules, procedures, or goals. Although there are
other ways to define these terms, I use these definitions because they
capture neatly both corpus users’ criticisms of other methods of
interpretation and their claim that corpus linguistics is a superior method of
interpretation. Using these definitions, criticism by corpus users of
interpretations that rely on the interpreter’s intuition or biased data can be
framed as a critique of the subjectivity of these methods compared with the
relative objectivity of corpus methods. These definitions also capture the
criticisms of corpus linguistics methods that I raise in Part V, below.

42

Craig v. Provo City, 389 P.3d, 423, 428 n.3 (Utah 2016); Baby E.Z., 266 P.3d at 728
(Lee, J., concurring); Ellen P. Aprill, The Law of the Word: Dictionary Shopping in the
Supreme Court, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 275, 297 (1998); James J. Brudney, Faithful Agency
Versus Ordinary Meaning Advocacy, 57 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 975, 981 (2013); Mouritsen,
supra note 28, at 1921; Lawrence M. Solan, Can Corpus Linguistics Help Make Originalism
Scientific, 127 YALE L.J.F. 57, 59 (2016).
43
Objective, THE SAGE DICTIONARY OF SOCIOLOGY (1984) (“[W]e are being objective
when we see things accurately, without our perception being distorted by our preferences,
biases, and prejudices.”); Fiss, supra note 4, at 744–45 (“[A]n interpretation can be
measured against a set of norms that transcend the particular vantage point of the person
offering the interpretation.”). See William Eskridge, The New Textualism and Normative
Canons, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 531, 576 (2013) (a canon is objective if it “impels judges to
read statutes without regard to their own political preferences”). See also WILLARD QUINE,
WORD AND OBJECT 7–8 (1960).
44
Frank Lovett, What Counts as Arbitrary Power?, 5 J. POL. POWer 137, 139 (2012)
(defining arbitrary power). Cf. DOUGLAS E. EDLIN, COMMON LAW JUDGING 59 (2016) (“the
opposite of validity is arbitrariness”).
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A. Intuition and Statutory Interpretation
The resort to intuition in statutory interpretation is neither new nor
particularly controversial. As a number of commentators have noted, a
native speaker’s intuitive understanding of the meaning of a word is, in an
important sense, its ordinary meaning.45 In ordinary speech, speakers do
not refer to “definitions, rules, or reasons” governing language use. Rather,
speakers “simply use words,” which are understood “because use and
meaning are constituted by the life and practices of a community.” 46 In this
view, interpretation should largely be a non-technical exercise: a
“competent user of ordinary language” normally should be able to
determine a word’s meaning.47 This view of interpretation is supported by
an important strain of linguistic theory. Noam Chomsky explains that
native speakers of a language know (or perhaps better, “cognize”48)
whether language use is ordinary or atypical, grammatical or
ungrammatical.49 In line with this view, it is common for judges to
interpret statutes based on their intuitive understanding of the meaning of
statutory text.50
This optimistic view of intuition, and the judicial practice that flows
from it, has been criticized by corpus users,51 among many others.52
45
Robert Summers, The Argument from Ordinary Meaning in Statutory Interpretation,
in ESSAYS IN LEGAL THEORY 216 (2000); Gries & Slocum, supra note 9, at 1434; Lawrence
M. Solan, The New Textualists New Text, 38 LOY. U. L.A. L. REV. 2027, 2053–54 (2005)
(“simple introspection is generally adequate to discover” the “most ordinary sense” of
statutory language); Solan & Gales, supra note 17, at 1332.
46
Paul E. McGreal, Slighting Context: On the Illogic of Ordinary Speech in Statutory
Interpretation, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 325, 334 (2004).
47
Summers, supra note 45, at 228.
48
NOAM CHOMSKY, RULES AND REPRESENTATIONS 70 (1980).
49
See NOAM CHOMSKY, LANGUAGE AND THE PROBLEMS OF KNOWLEDGE 3 (1988);
Alani Golanski, Linguistics in Law, 66 ALB. L. REV. 61 (2002); Lawrence M. Solan, Can the
Legal System Use Experts on Meaning, 66 TENN. L. REV. 1167, 1181 (1999).
50
Indeed, Justice Lee, a principal judicial proponent of corpus linguistics for
interpretive purposes, acknowledges as much. State v. Rasabout, 356 P.3d 1258, 1274
(Utah 2015) (Lee, J., concurring) (“That leaves a third explanation for the majority’s
conclusion: The court’s sense of discharge as shoot may simply be an expression of the
majority’s linguistic intuition.”). See RICHARD POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE
72–73 (1990) (noting that practical reason, including intuition, is our “principal set of tools
for answering questions large and small”); id. at 124–25 (“Intuition, itself a method of
practical reason, has its claims, and establishes presumptions that the other methods of
practical reason may not always be able to overcome.”).
51
Gries & Slocum, supra note 9, at 1441; Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 7, at 806–07;
Mouritsen, supra note 8, at 175–78; Nuñez, supra note 26, at 1520–21; Joseph Scott Miller,
Reasonable Certainty & Corpus Linguistics, 66 U. KAN. L. REV. 39, 45–46 (2017);
Lawrence B. Solum, Originalist Methodology, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 269, 283–84 (2017).
52
Outside the context of corpus linguistics, and indeed outside the context of statutory
interpretation, judicial intuition has been both defended and criticized. See, e.g., Arthur L.
Corbin, The Interpretation of Words and the Parole Evidence Rule, 50 CORNELL L. REV.
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Intuition, they argue, is a poor indicator of word meaning. Although
intuition may be able to tell an interpreter whether a usage is
ungrammatical, it cannot reliably be used to measure “the statistical
frequency of words and word senses.”53 In other words, proponents of
corpus linguistics argue, to the extent that ordinariness of meaning is linked
to frequency of use (an assumption certainly open to challenge),54 intuition
cannot tell a judge which of two grammatical usages is the more ordinary
one.55 Instead, when judges rely on their intuition, their interpretive
decisions can obscure why legislative drafters chose to use one term rather
than another56 or may simply be the result of a particular judge’s
idiosyncratic lexicon.57 Moreover, even if reliance on intuition is up to the
task of getting us through our daily lives without great difficulty,58 statutory
interpretation is a specialized activity that requires a more precise source of
language data than intuition can provide. As Professors Lawrence Solan
and Tammy Gales have described, the fine distinctions among word senses
that judicial decisions require do not lend themselves to resolution by
intuition alone.59 Thomas Lee, Associate Justice of the Utah Supreme
Court, and an outspoken proponent of corpus linguistics, has described
judicial intuition as “less-than-perfect,”60 “fallible,”61 and “unreliable.”62
Proponents of corpus linguistics usage point to Judge Richard
Posner’s use of Google as an example of a well-intentioned, but ultimately
insufficient, attempt to cure problems associated with intuition.63 In
Costello, Judge Posner used Google to determine the meaning of the

161, 164 (1965) (arguing that, in the context of contract interpretation, “when a judge
refuses to consider relevant extrinsic evidence on the ground that the meaning of written
words is to him plain and clear, his decision is formed by and wholly based upon the
completely extrinsic evidence of his own personal education and experience”).
53
Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 7, at 831.
54
See generally Ehrett, supra note 17, at 62–64; Herenstein, supra note 17, at 116–19;
Hessick, supra note 17, at 1508–09.
55
Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 7, at 831; Mouritsen, supra note 8, at 175. Moreover,
Chomsky’s views on the innateness of language have been criticized as unsupported by
biological research and the variety of extant grammatical structures. See generally Wolfram
Hinzan, The Philosophical Significance of Universal Grammar, 34 LANG. SCI. 635 (2012).
56
Rasabout, 356 P.3d at 1274.
57
Mouritsen, supra note 8, at 175. See Gries & Slocum, supra note 9, at 1441.
58
See Miller, supra note 25, at 2 (noting that polysemy “seldom causes any problems”
in “everyday life”).
59
See generally Solan & Gales, supra note 45, at 1311.
60
State v. J.M.S., 280 P.3d 410, 419 (Utah 2011) (Lee, J., concurring).
61
Rasabout, 356 P.3d at 1275 (Lee, J., concurring).
62
In re Adoption of Baby E.Z., 266 P.3d 702, 727 (Utah 2011) (Lee, J., concurring).
63
Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 7, at 812–13; Phillips, Ortner & Lee, supra note 8, at
28–29.
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statutory term “harbor.”64 Posner first formulated phrases, like “harboring
fugitives,” and searched for them on Google. He then noted how many
search results matched the phrases he formulated and drew conclusions
about the scope of “harbor” in the statute from the frequency with which
his phrases appeared in the search results.65 As proponents of corpus
linguistics techniques have argued, Posner’s use of Google reflects his
intuition about which phrases containing “harbor” were likely to return
results that could be compared profitably.66 In other words, he searched
only for those phrases that he thought were representative of potential
meanings of harbor in the statute. His intuition about the possible statutory
meanings of harbor may have been correct, and his choice of phrases to
search well-considered, but the results his search returned were limited by
his intuition about what searches to perform.67
Corpus users view reliance on corpus data to be a partial antidote to
the subjectivity they attribute to reliance on intuition. Professor Lawrence
Solum has argued that by relying on an individual’s recollection, intuition
provides only secondary evidence of language usage; corpus linguistics, by
contrast, provides primary evidence of language usage.68
Other
commentators have argued that, in contrast with reliance on intuition,
corpus linguistics is transparent; that is, by relying on data of language
usage, a corpus user’s conclusions about language usage can be challenged
by other users.69 Justice Lee made a detailed defense of corpus usage as
compared with reliance on intuition in his concurring opinion in
Rasabout.70 In that case, the court interpreted the word “discharge” in a
statute that prohibited unlawful discharge of a firearm. The question before
the court was whether the defendant’s action, firing twelve shots in rapid
succession at the same target, was a single “discharge” or twelve separate
discharges. The majority held that each shot was a separate discharge,
justifying the conviction of twelve counts of violating the unlawful
discharge statute.71
In concurrence, Lee opined that the court’s conclusion was based on
its equation of “discharge” with “shoot.” Lee argued that this conclusion,
while not necessarily wrong, was based on the court’s intuition that
64

United States v. Costello, 666 F.3d 1040, 1044 (7th Cir. 2012).
Id.
66
Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 7, at 812–13.
67
Id.
68
Solum, supra note 51, at 283–84.
69
Mouritsen, supra note 8, at 202–03; John D. Ramer, Corpus Linguistics: Misfire or
More Ammo for the Ordinary Meaning Canon, 116 MICH. L. REV. 303, 326 (2017) (arguing
that “transparency” is the COCA’s greatest strength).
70
State v. Rasabout, 356 P.3d 1258, 1274 (Utah 2015) (Lee, J., concurring).
71
Id. at 1262–64.
65
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“discharge” and “shoot” are roughly synonymous. Lee objected not to the
conclusion, but to the fact that the court did not test its intuition against
alternatives. When judges rely on intuition, he argued, they often fail to
acknowledge that there are “alternative senses of the operative terms.”72
Because a judge’s intuition is based on her particular experiences and
recollections of a word’s meaning, the parties are deprived of the ability to
challenge the basis of judge’s conclusion. Although a judge’s intuition
may be representative of general usage, it may be idiosyncratic instead.73
Corpus linguistics methods, Lee opined, cure this defect in intuition-based
textual analysis by allowing an interpreter to demonstrate how she
determined a word’s meaning. Lee tested his intuition that “discharge”
means “shoot” by searching a corpus for information about how discharge
is used when referring to a firearm. By relying on publicly available data
rather than intuition, Lee argued, his assumptions can be challenged, his
methods replicated, and conclusions falsified or validated.74 Other corpus
users have acknowledged that corpus usage does not completely eliminate
subjectivity due to reliance on intuition. Gries and Slocum noted that “a
certain degree of subjective intuition is virtually unavoidable” in corpus
analysis.75 And Mouritsen acknowledged that the “human beings at both
ends of the corpus—the architect and the user” are both “subject to . . .
errors and biases.”76 But, corpus users tend to agree with Lee that, by
making the decision-making process more transparent, corpus linguistics
provides a standard against which one user’s conclusions can be measured
by another.77
B. Biased Reference Data and Statutory Interpretation
When they do not rely on their intuition about the meaning of a text,
legal interpreters refer to materials outside the text being interpreted to
determine its meaning. This, too, is common and uncontroversial, at least
in some forms. When an interpreter searches Westlaw to learn how other
judges have interpreted a statutory term—for example “knowingly and
willfully”—she is seeking word meaning outside the text of the statute
itself.78 Seeking meaning from reference data becomes more controversial,
72

Id. at 1274.
Id. at 1274–75. See also id. at 1275 n.10; Gries & Slocum, supra note 9, at 1441.
74
Rasabout, 356 P.3d at 1282.
75
Gries & Slocum, supra note 9, at 1447.
76
Mouritsen, supra note 8, at 203.
77
Id.; Ramer, supra note 69, at 326 (arguing that “transparency” is the COCA’s
greatest strength).
78
See, e.g., United States v. Wheeler, 540 F.3d 683, 689 (7th Cir. 2008) (interpreting
“knowingly and willfully” in embezzlement statute). For just a few of the hundreds of
federal and state statutes that use the phrase “knowingly and willfully,” both in the criminal
73
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however, when it appears the data consulted have been compiled or
selected arbitrarily, opportunistically, or otherwise without justification.79
The much-criticized80 Muscarello case illustrates how courts sometimes
interpret statutory language by referring to data that appears to be selected
arbitrarily.81 In Muscarello, the Supreme Court considered whether a
person “carries” a firearm when he drives with it in his locked glove
compartment or trunk. The Court weighed two possible interpretations: if
carry means only to “bear on one’s person,” then the conduct was not
prohibited; by contrast, if carry means “transport,” then it covered the
defendants’ conduct. The Court interpreted the word carry by referring to
the use of that word in a wide variety of sources, including Robinson
Crusoe, Moby Dick, the King James Bible, newspaper articles, and a series
of dictionaries.82 Although Muscarello has been widely criticized, it is not
unique. Courts, with regularity, consult materials outside the text to
determine the meaning of words in statutes.83 In Whitfield, the Supreme
Court interpreted the word “accompany” by reference to the use of that
word in David Copperfield, Pride and Prejudice, and a newspaper
marriage announcement.84 And as noted above, in Costello, Judge Posner
performed a Google search to determine the meaning of the word “harbor”
in a statute that prohibited harboring an alien.85
Users of corpus linguistics techniques criticize these uses of extratextual materials, but not because they object to searching for meaning
outside the statutory text. Indeed, corpus users support the search for
meaning outside the text of the statute being interpreted.86 They do
criticize, however, what they perceive to be subjective and unprincipled
references to materials outside the text—what Lee and Mouritsen have

and civil context, see, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2018); 6 U.S.C. § 625 (2018); 15 U.S.C. § 1196
(2018); 18 U.S.C. § 669 (2018); 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2018); 21 U.S.C. § 331(yy) (2018); 2
U.S.C. § 1966 (2018); 42 U.S.C. § 1383 (2018); 49 U.S.C. § 60123 (2018); LA. STAT. ANN.
§ 18:1505.5 (2006); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 146.84. (West 2006).
79
James Brudney & Lawrence Baum, Oasis or Mirage: The Supreme Court’s Thirst
for Dictionaries in the Rehnquist and Roberts Eras, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 483, 490, 566
(2013).
80
Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 7, at 807–10; Mouritsen, supra note 28, at 1931–32;
Solan, supra note 45, at 2052–53.
81
Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S 125, 126–127 (1998).
82
Id. at 128–31.
83
Magone v. Heller, 150 U.S. 70, 74–75 (1893) (citing one of Shakespeare’s plays for
the meaning of statutory text); Bok v. McCaughn, 42 F.2d 616, 618–19 (3d Cir. 1930)
(citing a version of the Bible for the meaning of statutory text).
84
Whitfield v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 785, 788 (2015).
85
United States v. Costello, 666 F.3d 1040, 1044 (7th Cir. 2012).
86
E.g., Gries & Slocum, supra note 9, at 1441; Lee and Mouritsen, supra note 7, at
807.
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called “simple cherry-picking.”87 As Solan has noted, the Muscarello
Court chose reference materials without offering a reason why they were
relevant to the interpretive question before the Court.88 For example, the
Court referred to the Latin and Old French roots of “carry” and to the use
of the word in a translation of the Bible to derive its meaning. It is not
obvious why etymological information or use of a word in translation is
relevant to the meaning of statutory text and the Court provided no
explanation.89
Corpus users have criticized the practice of resorting to dictionaries
for interpreting statutes especially harshly.90 Although dictionaries are
routinely consulted by not only the Supreme Court,91 but lower federal
courts92 and state courts93 as well, the practice has long been criticized by
scholars.94 Among the many shortcomings that have been described,
dictionaries are detached from ordinary meaning and legislative intent,95
they are often deliberately devoid of context,96 they do not purport to
describe all semantically acceptable word meanings,97 they contain

87

Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 7, at 807.
Solan, supra note 45, at 2052.
89
Id. (criticizing citation to etymology and the Bible); Mouritsen, supra note 28, at
1939–40 (criticizing reference to etymology). The Court hinted at an explanation when it
noted that the “greatest of writers” have used the term “carry” in the way it suggested.
Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S 125, 129 (1998). The Court did not explain the
relevance to statutory meaning of the way these writers used the phrase. The Court, perhaps,
was implying that these great writers used the word in a typical or ordinary way. Typical or
ordinary usage in a novel or the Bible, however, is not the same as typical or ordinary usage
in a statute.
90
Mouritsen, supra note 28, at 1939; BRIAN G. SLOCUM, ORDINARY MEANING: A
THEORY OF THE MOST FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION 217 (2015).
91
E.g., Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1081 (2015); Taniguchi v. Kan Pac.
Saipan, Ltd., 566 U.S. 560, 566–69 (2012); MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co.,
512 U.S. 218, 225 (1994); Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 228–29 (1993).
92
E.g., Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“dictionaries . . .
have been properly recognized as among the many tools that can assist the court in
determining the meaning of particular terminology”); Zatarains, Inc. v. Oak Grove
Smokehouse, Inc., 698 F.2d 786, 792 (5th Cir. 1983).
93
E.g., Wasatch Prop. Mgmt. v. Degrate, 112 P.3d 647, 653 (Cal. 2005); Koontz v.
Ameritech Servs., Inc., 645 N.W.2d 34, 39 (Mich. 2002); Madison Constr. Co. v.
Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co., 735 A.2d 100, 107–08 (Pa. 1999).
94
Brudney & Baum, supra note 79, at 490, 566; Pamela Hobbs, Defining the Law:
(Mis)using the Dictionary to Decide Cases, 13 DISCOURSE STUD. 327, 330-31 (2011). See
also United States v. Costello, 666 F.3d 1040, 1043–44 (7th Cir. 2012); Cabell v. Markham,
148 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir. 1945).
95
Alice A. Wang, Googling for Meaning: Statutory Interpretation in the Digital Age,
125 YALE L.J.F. 267, 278 (2016).
96
Costello, 666 F.3d at 1044; see also Craig v. Provo City, 389 P.3d 423, 428 n.3
(Utah 2016).
97
Aprill, supra note 42, at 297.
88
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definitions that support multiple readings of the statute,98 and they are often
used opportunistically by legal interpreters.99 To take just one recent
example of the dubious value of judicial use of dictionaries, the Court of
Appeals of Utah100 relied, in part, on a definition in the Urban
Dictionary,101 a crowdsourced, online compilation of user-approved phrases
and their definitions, often including “ad-hoc neologism[s], invented just
for this dictionary.”102 Similarly, proponents of corpus linguistics have
criticized Judge Posner’s use of Google, in part, because of the secrecy in
the way that Google returns search results. This secrecy, they argue,
detracts from the ability to replicate the results of a Google search.103
Proponents of corpus linguistics techniques argue that corpus research
is not prone to the same biases that affect legal interpreters using reference
materials like dictionaries or Google. Using a general corpus, like the
COCA, they argue, allows a legal interpreter to search for the meaning of a
word in the context of how words are ordinarily used in spoken and written
language.104 This process mitigates the bias inherent in the choice of a
word’s meaning from a list of dictionary definitions, which is necessarily
acontextual.105
Moreover, they argue, using corpus data broadly
representative of written and spoken language diminishes the bias
associated with the interpreter’s choice of a particular dictionary.106
Compared with Google, proponents of corpus linguistics techniques argue,
corpora like the COCA are more transparent about the methodologies they
use to organize search results. As a result, the use of corpora like the
COCA is less likely to reflect biases that are unknown and unknowable to
the average user not privy to Google’s search algorithm.107
In conclusion, this Part described the dream of objectivity pursued by
users of corpus linguistics. It is a dream rooted in perceived deficiencies of
98

See Craig, 389 P.3d at 428 n.3.
Brudney & Baum, supra note 79, at 490, 566; Brudney, supra note 42, at 975, 981.
This is, strictly speaking, a criticism of dictionary use, not of dictionaries themselves. But,
to the extent that dictionaries are especially susceptible to opportunistic use, it is worth
including this flaw among the dictionary’s other shortcomings.
100
Utah is, incidentally, the intellectual home of the use of corpus linguistics methods
for legal interpretation.
101
O’Hearon v. Hansen, 409 P.3d 85, 93 n.8 (Utah Ct. App. 2017).
102
Virginia Heffernan, Street Smart: The Unruly, Unlexicographical but Surprisingly
Useful Offerings of Urban Dictionary, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 2009, at SM16.
103
Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 7, at 812.
104
Id. at 831–32.
105
Gries & Slocum, supra note 9, at 1441.
106
Id. at 1438.
107
See Eric Goldman, Search Engine Bias and the Demise of Search Engine
Utopianism, 8 YALE J.L. & TECH. 188, 192–94 (2005-2006). See also A. Diaz, Through the
Google Goggles: Sociopolitical Bias in Search Engine Design, in WEB SEARCH:
MULTIDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES 29–30 (Spink and Zimmer, eds., 2008).
99
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common methods of statutory interpretation, like reliance on judicial
intuition and reliance on certain reference materials extrinsic to the text.
As corpus users describe these methods of interpretation, they are
subjective within the definition given earlier. An interpretation relying on
intuition is subjective because it is not constrained by effective procedures
and may be colored by the idiosyncratic knowledge and disposition of the
interpreter. Reliance on sources like dictionaries and Google searches is
subjective because these sources contain data that is biased in favor of
atypical uses; reliance on these biased data will obscure accurate
interpretations. By contrast, they argue, corpus linguistics results are
objective within the definition described above because they reflect data
that is broadly representative of ordinary language usage. Because they
reflect ordinary language, corpus users argue, they are not susceptible to
biases that distort the result. Part IV, below, assesses whether the dream of
objectivity held by proponents of corpus linguistics withstands scrutiny.
IV. CORPUS LINGUISTICS AND THE REALITY OF SUBJECTIVITY
Proponents of corpus linguistics argue that, by using corpus
linguistics techniques, interpreters can reduce the subjectivity endemic to
statutory interpretation.108 Although some corpus users acknowledge that
the elimination of subjectivity is impossible, 109 they argue that corpus
linguistics methods are not as subjective as other methods of
interpretation.110 Perhaps most explicitly, Lee and Mouritsen argue that
corpus linguistics can “help us deliver on the promise of an objective
inquiry”111 and, in particular, help textualism deliver on its “promise of
determinacy.”112 Indeed, as Professor Carissa Byrne Hessick explained in
her critique of using corpus linguistics techniques to interpret criminal
statutes, much of the appeal of corpus linguistics is “that it promises us
right answers.”113 Because users of corpus linguistics for statutory
interpretation place such weight on its ability to reduce subjectivity, it is
appropriate to assess the depth and contours of the subjectivity involved in
using corpus linguistics itself. Only then can potential users of corpus
linguistics techniques for statutory interpretation—including judges and
scholars—make an informed decision about whether corpus linguistics
108
State v. Rasabout, 356 P.3d 1258, 1274–75 (Utah 2015) (Lee, J., concurring); State v.
J.M.S., 280 P.3d 410, 419 (Utah 2011) (Lee, J., concurring); Gries & Slocum, supra note 9,
at 1441; Lee and Mouritsen, supra note 7, at 867; Mouritsen, supra note 8, at 175–78;
Nuñez, supra note 26, at 1521; Phillips & White, supra note 26, at 186–87.
109
Gries & Slocum, supra note 9, at 1447; Mouritsen, supra note 8, at 203.
110
Gries & Slocum, supra note 9, at 1441; Lee and Mouritsen, supra note 7, at 807.
111
Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 7, at 796.
112
Id. at 876.
113
Hessick, supra note 17, at 1519.
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techniques offer any advantage over other methods of interpretation.
Despite the emphasis that users of corpus linguistics place on its
subjectivity-reducing capabilities, corpus linguistics techniques involve
significant subjective interpretive choices. These choices disrupt the dream
of objectivity held by proponents of corpus linguistics as a method of
statutory interpretation. There are a number of distinct points during the
interpretive process at which a user of corpus techniques must make a
subjective decision that influences the interpretive outcome. First, at the
beginning of the interpretive process, a user of corpus linguistics
techniques must choose a particular corpus to search. Just as a legal
interpreter resorting to a dictionary must choose one or more dictionaries to
consult,114 users of corpus linguistics techniques must choose a particular
corpus to search. There are many different corpora. Each contains a
different mix of texts and reliance on one does not lead to the same results
on reliance on another.115 Second, the user must choose search parameters.
If a statute makes it a crime to “carry a firearm,” for example, the corpus
user must decide whether to search for the word “carry,” the phrase “carry
a firearm,” or some other term.116 The corpus user also must decide
whether and how to customize the search to return results indicating only
certain parts of speech,117 or results reflecting certain geographic
locations,118 speech communities,119 or time periods.120 Third, a corpus
search will often return results that the user believes are not germane to the
statutory inquiry. The user of corpus linguistics techniques must make a
subjective decision about which search results to evaluate and which results
to exclude from evaluation.121
Because each of these three sources of subjectivity is significant
enough to warrant its own separate treatment, this Article will explore just
the first source of subjectivity identified above: the choice of corpus. This
Part first examines the act of choosing a corpus and concludes that, rather
than leading to an objective interpretation, the choice of corpus introduces
subjectivity into the interpretive process. It next assesses the choice of
corpus consistently made by users of corpus techniques—a general corpus
populated by nonlegal language—and concludes that it is the wrong choice
114

Aprill, supra note 42, at 296–97; Gries & Slocum, supra note 9, at 1421.
Solan & Gales, supra note 17, at 1311. Compare NOW CORPUS (NEWS ON THE
WEB), https://corpus.byu.edu/now (last visited Sept. 16, 2019) with CORPUS HISTORICAL
AM. ENG., https://corpus.byu.edu/coha (last visited Sept. 16, 2019).
116
Solan & Gales, supra note 17, at 1346.
117
Ramer, supra note 69, at 327. See also Gries & Slocum, supra note 9, at 1448.
118
E.g., Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 7, at 857.
119
Solan, supra note 45, at 2059.
120
Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 7, at 857.
121
E.g., Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 7, at 850–51.
115
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for statutory interpretation. Finally, it considers the possibility of using a
still-hypothetical “legal corpus;” it concludes that this hypothetical corpus
would not ameliorate the subjectivity problems that plague the choice of
corpus.
A. The Choice of Corpus is Subjective
Just as a legal interpreter resorting to a dictionary must choose a
particular dictionary to use, so too must the user of corpus linguistics
techniques choose a corpus to search. The choice of corpus is subjective
because it is not constrained by any principle that suggests why one corpus
rather than another should be chosen. As Professor Solan has explained,
there is nothing internal to a particular corpus that requires its use in certain
circumstances.122 Likewise, there is nothing about a particular term or
phrase that tells the interpreter which corpus to use when searching for its
meaning. As a result, simply by opting for a corpus search, the user of
corpus linguistics techniques introduces a subjective element into the
interpretive process.
Corpus usage confirms that the choice of corpus is subjective: corpus
users rely on multiple or different corpora without articulating a standard
for determining when one corpus would be appropriate and another would
not be appropriate. Take Lee and Mouritsen’s searches for the terms
“vehicle,” “carry,” and “interpreter” in their work advocating the adoption
of corpus techniques.123 Lee and Mouritsen rely on searches in the News
on the Web (NOW) Corpus and the Corpus of Historical American English
(COHA) without describing why either or both of these corpora are
appropriate for their searches and despite the significant differences
between the texts found in these corpora.124 The NOW Corpus, for
example, contains not only news sources, but also online magazines with
subjects as diverse as video games, cricket, and fashion. And the origin of
these web sources? The NOW Corpus includes texts that come not only
from the United States, but, unless specifically excluded by the researcher,
texts from markedly different linguistic communities, like India, Nigeria,
Singapore, Kenya, Pakistan, and the Philippines, among others.125 The
122

Solan, supra note 45, at 2059–60. See also Solan & Gales, supra note 17, at 1314–

15.
123

Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 7, at 836–51.
Id. See Solan, supra note 42, at 60–61 (arguing that there is a substantive choice
involved in searching for ordinary meaning rather than an expansive meaning or specialized
meaning).
125
NOW CORPUS (NEWS ON THE WEB), supra note 115. The NOW Corpus contains
“8.5 billion words of data from web-based newspapers and magazines from 2010 to the
present time. More importantly, the corpus grows by about 140–160 million words of data
each month (from about 300,000 new articles), or about 1.8 billion words each year.” It is
124
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COHA, by contrast, includes different kinds of texts, including movie
scripts and poetry.126
Some proponents of corpus linguistics techniques acknowledge that
they must choose a corpus, but minimize the significance of the choice by
suggesting that it is driven by a distinction between “ordinary” words and
legal terms of art.127 If the word under consideration is an “ordinary” one,
they search for it in a general corpus, like the COHA, the COCA, or the
NOW Corpus; by contrast, if it is a legal term of art, some intimate that
interpreters should use a still-hypothetical specialized legal corpus.128
However, framing the choice of corpus as a choice between an ordinary
term and a legal term of art does not eliminate its subjectivity; it merely
substitutes one subjective decision for another. The determination that a
word is ordinary itself reflects a subjective decision because there is not an
objective way to distinguish between ordinary words and legal terms of
art.129 As linguists have noted, the line between legal terms of art and
ordinary words is indistinct at best. David Mellinkoff notes that not every
word “that has the sound of the law is a term of art.”130 Conversely, many
words that sound ordinary, because they are used in nonlegal settings, also
have specialized legal meanings.131 For these reasons, the “difference

possible to limit NOW’s results by country.
126
CORPUS HISTORICAL AM. ENG., supra note 115.
127
See Phillips, Ortner & Lee, supra note 8, at 23 (asserting without explanation that
“corruption of blood” is a term of art while “commerce” is an ordinary word).
128
Phillips, Ortner & Lee, supra note 8, at 24–25. See also Solan, supra note 42, at 59–
60 (noting that searching a corpus designed to reflect ordinary meaning is not very useful
for determining the meaning of terms of art). Cf. James A. Heilpern, Dialects of Art: A
Corpus-Based Approach to Technical Term of Art Determinations in Statutes, 58
JURIMETRICS 4, 380 (2018) (suggesting that technical terms of art (but not legal terms of art)
should be interpreted according to meaning found in technical documents).
129
E.g., Heikki E. S. Mattila, Legal Vocabulary, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
LANGUAGE AND LAW, supra note 6, at 29, 31 (“The difference between legal terms and
words of ordinary language is relative and hard to define.”); DAVID MELLINKOFF, THE
LANGUAGE OF THE LAW 17–18 (2004) (describing that some, but not every, legal-sounding
term is a term of art and that some legal words are intended for both lawyers and nonlawyers); PETER M. TIERSMA, LEGAL LANGUAGE 107–08 (1999); Isabel Richard, Is Legal
Lexis Characteristic of Legal Language, 11 J. LEGAL LEXICOLOGY 1, 9 (2018) (“Firstly,
legal lexis is used by law, but not exclusively, and may have legal meaning, but not
necessarily.”).
130
MELLINKOFF, supra note 129, at 17.
131
Mattila, supra note 129, at 31 (“[T]he use of ordinary words in a technical legal
sense is particularly widespread.”); MELLINKOFF, supra note 129, at 11–12; Ralf Poscher,
Ambiguity and Vagueness in Legal Interpretation, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
LANGUAGE AND LAW, supra note 6, at 132; Frederick Schauer, Hohfeld on Legal Language,
in THE LEGACY OF WESLEY HOHFELD: EDITED MAJOR WORKS, SELECT PERSONAL PAPERS,
AND ORIGINAL COMMENTARIES 7–8 (Shyam Balganesh et al. eds., forthcoming),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3183858 (noting that words like search
and seizure have legal meanings that are both over- and under-inclusive of their ordinary
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between legal terms and words of ordinary language is relative and hard to
define.”132 Even linguists who are more optimistic about the possibility of
identifying legal terms of art recognize the significant disagreement over
what constitutes a legal term.133 Because choosing to designate a statutory
term ordinary rather than legal does not appear to be “reliably
constrained,”134 the choice between a general corpus and a stillhypothetical specialized legal corpus is subjective.135
Practice confirms the subjectivity of designating a term ordinary or
legal.
Rather than announcing and adhering to a standard for
distinguishing between ordinary terms and legal terms, corpus users treat
terms as ordinary without analysis and without adhering to any discernable
principle. For example, corpus users have searched for the statutory terms
“results in,”136 “information,”137 and “discharge”138 in the COCA. In none
of these cases did the interpreters demonstrate that they applied some rule
or principle to determine whether these words were ordinary rather than
legal terms. The recent American Bankers case is illustrative of the lack of
standards applied by corpus users choosing a general corpus. In that case,
the court relied on searches in the COHA and databases of newspaper
articles139 without acknowledging that these corpora differ in essential
ways. Similarly, in the Harris case, the Michigan Supreme Court relied on
a search in the COCA to uncover the meaning of the term “information.”140
The court asserted that it was searching for the ordinary meaning of the
term, but did not justify this assertion. Curiously, the court purported to
rely on a statute that governs statutory interpretation in that state. The
statute the court relied on, however, provides no support for the proposition
meaning); David A. Strauss, Why Plain Meaning?, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1565, 1568
(1997) (“Moreover, the so-called ‘ordinary meaning’ is not so ordinary. It is the ordinary
legal meaning . . . . Terms like witness, zoning, even speed limit, when used in a legal
context, can mean something quite different from what they might mean when used in other
contexts.”).
132
Mattila, supra note 129, at 31. See also TIERSMA, supra note 129, at 108 (the
distinction between terms of art and legal jargon “is mainly one of degree”).
133
TIERSMA, supra note 129, at 108.
134
Lovett, supra note 44, at 139 (defining arbitrary power). In the context of
“intersubjectivity,” “the opposite of validity is arbitrariness.” EDLIN, supra note 44, at 59.
135
As will be discussed in Part IV.C, infra, even if it were possible to determine
objectively that a statutory term is a legal term of art rather than an ordinary term, a single
term of art can have multiple meanings because there is not a single “legal English.”
136
Wilson v. Safelite, Grp., Inc., 930 F.3d 429, 439–40 (6th Cir. 2019) (Thapar, J.,
concurring).
137
People v. Harris, 885 N.W.2d 832, 839, 839 n.33 (Mich. 2016).
138
State v. Rasabout, 356 P.3d 1258, 1274–75 (Utah 2015) (Lee, J., concurring).
139
Am. Bankers Ass’n v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin, 306 F. Supp. 2d 44, 68 n.5 (D.D.C.
2018).
140
Harris, 885 N.W.2d at 839.
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that the word at issue should be interpreted as an ordinary term; rather, it
simply provides that an ordinary word should be given its ordinary
meaning while a term of art should be interpreted according to its
appropriate technical meaning.141 Nevertheless, the court searched a
general corpus without indicating why the word “information” in the
statute was an ordinary one rather than a legal term of art.142
Moreover, even when corpus users acknowledge that ordinary terms
and specialized terms should be treated differently, the reason for their
choice of a general corpus is obscure. Take, for example, the Utah case, In
re: Baby E.Z. In his dissent, Justice Lee considered the interpretation of
the word “custody” in the federal Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act. Lee
acknowledged that statutory terms of art should be read according to their
legal meaning rather than their ordinary meaning. 143 He found that the
statutory term was a legal term that should be interpreted according to its
legal meaning.144 Nevertheless, Justice Lee proceeded to search for
“custody” in the COCA,145 a general corpus that includes transcriptions of
spoken language, fiction, popular magazines, newspaper articles, and
academic works but, crucially, no statutory text.146 Lee’s reliance on the
COCA in Baby E.Z. suggests that corpus users are not relying on a
distinction between ordinary terms and legal terms when choosing a
corpus. That is, it appears that no matter whether a word is a legal term or
an ordinary one, the corpus user will search a general corpus for its
meaning. If Lee’s use of the COCA in Baby E.Z. is the correct way to use
corpus techniques to interpret statutes, it is difficult to imagine the
existence of a test that can be used to choose a corpus objectively.
B. A Corpus of Nonlegal Language is the Wrong Choice for Statutory
Interpretation
Users of corpus linguistics techniques for statutory interpretation
rely—virtually exclusively—on searches in general corpora, like the
COCA or the COHA. The justification for interpreting statutory language
in accordance with the meaning of words in a general corpus rests on the
assumption that the meaning of words in a general corpus is the same, in a
141

MICH. COMP. LAWS § 8.3(a) (2017).
See also Rasabout, 356 P.3d at 1274–75 (Lee, J., concurring) (rejecting without
explanation the argument that a statutory term was used as a legal term).
143
In re Adoption of Baby E.Z., 266 P.3d 702, 723-24 (Utah 2011) (Lee, J.,
concurring).
144
Id. (“Instead, the omission of a definition for the term ‘custody’ and its repeated use
in the [Act] suggest that we ought to interpret the term with reference to its ordinary legal
meaning.”).
145
Id. at 724–25 n.23.
146
CORPUS CONTEMPORARY AM. ENG., supra note 30.
142
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relevant way, as the meaning of those same words in statutes. Users of
corpus linguistics for statutory interpretation justify the equation of
statutory language and general corpus language by suggesting that statutory
language and general corpus language are both “ordinary” uses of
language. That is, they argue that the law often requires them to look for
the “ordinary meaning” of statutory language and that they can find this
meaning by looking at the way language is used in a general corpus.147
Embedded in this argument is the premise that the ordinary meaning
of statutory language is its nonlegal meaning.148 A number of scholars,
including scholars of corpus linguistics, have suggested that it would be
normatively attractive if this were true. Professor Slocum explains that if
“one assumes that successful communication is the goal in most cases,”
then statutes “should be understood by different people in the same
way . . . . [Therefore,] legal texts should be understandable to the general
public, as well as to judges and sophisticated practitioners.”149
There is, of course, ample authority for the proposition that the law
ought to provide notice to those who are governed by it. Famously, if
unrealistically, Jeremy Bentham argued that laws ought to put into the
mind of the citizen “an exact idea of the will of the legislator.”150 More
147

E.g. Wilson v. Safelite Grp., Inc., 930 F.3d 429, 439 (6th Cir. 2019) (Thapar, J.,
concurring).
148
This argument also assumes that courts are in fact attempting to interpret statutory
language to conform with ordinary meaning, however defined. It is true that courts
sometimes claim that they are searching for a term’s ordinary meaning. It would be a
mistake, however, to read too much into judicial statements that courts are in fact attempting
to interpret statutory language according to its ordinary meaning. For one reason, courts
typically do not confine their interpretations to ordinary meaning. SLOCUM, supra note 90,
at 172–174. As Miranda McGowan noted, the “ordinary meaning rule,” if it can be called a
rule, is “riddled with exceptions.” Miranda McGowan, Do as I Do, Not as I Say: An
Empirical Investigation of Justice Scalia’s Ordinary Meaning Method of Statutory
Interpretation, 78 MISS. L.J. 129, 140, 157 (2008). See also Linda D. Jellum, On Reading
the Language of Statutes, 8 U. MASS. L. Rev. 184, 204 (2013). For another reason, just as
often as courts claim that they are interpreting legal language according to its ordinary
meaning, they suggest that they are relying on the “plain meaning” of the text, a phrase that
linguists do not take to mean the same thing as “ordinary.” SLOCUM, supra note 90, at 22,
24–26. See, e.g. Kingdomware Techs., Inc. v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1969, 1978 (2016)
(applying the plain meaning of statutory language despite the statute’s prefatory language
announcing a different objective); Lockhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 142, 146 (2005)
(giving effect to plain meaning although Congress may not have intended it); Lamie v. U.S.
Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 535 (2004) (applying plain meaning although the sentence is
“awkward”); I.N.S. v. Phinpathya, 464 U.S. 183, 192 (1984) (applying the “plain meaning
of the statute” “however severe the consequences”). Because courts do not always purport
to apply a statute’s ordinary meaning, and because, even when they do, they do not always
apply the ordinary meaning in fact, it is misplaced to rely on judicial statements about their
search for ordinary meaning to conclude that it is appropriate to interpret statutory language
according to its ordinary meaning.
149
Slocum, supra note 17, at 14.
150
E.g., Jeremy Bentham, A General View of a Complete Code of Laws, in 3 THE
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modestly, Professor Richard Fallon suggests that law “too far divorced
from its ordinary understanding would not be legitimate.”151 And the
Supreme Court has reiterated that laws must “give the person of ordinary
intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he
may act accordingly.”152 But, the normative judgment that legislatures
should speak in language that is intelligible to the general public is not the
same as the descriptive claim that legislatures do in fact speak in the type
of language found in a general corpus—that is—nonlegal language.
Instead, the validity of searching a general corpus for the meaning of
statutory language depends on the descriptive claim that nonlegal language
is relevantly similar to statutory language.153
There is significant scholarly debate about whether legal language is
the same as nonlegal language in a way that is relevant to statutory
interpretation.154 Here, I will identify and discuss the differences between
nonlegal language and statutory language that bear directly on the question
of searching for statutory meaning in a general corpus.155 I demonstrate

WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 207–08 (1816).
151
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Statutory Interpretation Muddle, 114 NW. L. REV. 269,
331 (2019).
152
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972).
153
See Peter M. Tiersma, Some Myths About Legal Language, in SPEAKING OF
LANGUAGE AND LAW 27, 32 (Lawrence M. Solan et al. eds., Oxford Univ. Press, 2015)
(noting the longstanding hope that law can be expressed in a way that is understood by
ordinary people, but concluding that this is unlikely). Moreover, the normative argument
that legislatures should speak in nonlegal language is doubtful. Because of the complex
tasks that modern legislation is designed to accomplish, any attempt by legislatures to write
in nonlegal language is apt to be ineffective.
154
E.g., Andrei Marmor, The Pragmatics of Legal Language, 21 RATIO JURIS 423, 429
(2008); Frederick Schauer, On the Relationship Between Legal and Ordinary Language, in
SPEAKING OF LANGUAGE AND LAW, supra note 153, at 35; Frederick Schauer, Is Law a
Technical Language, 52 SAN DIEGO L. Rev. 501, 501–02 (2015); Schauer, supra note 131,
at 18-21; SLOCUM, supra note 90, at 5–14; William Baude & Stephen Sachs, The Law of
Interpretation, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1082, 1085–87 (2017); Summers, supra note 45, at 229;
David A. Strauss, Why Plain Meaning?, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1565, 1568 (1997); Paul
E. McGreal, Slighting Context: On the Illogic of Ordinary Speech in Statutory
Interpretation, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 325, 334–35 (2004); Marc Poirier, On Whose Authority?
Linguists’ Claim of Authority to Interpret Statutes, 73 WASH. U. L. Q. 1025, 1033–34, 1057
(1995); Victoria Nourse, Two Kinds of Plain Meaning, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 997, 1000–05
(2011); Mark Greenberg, Legislation as Communication? Legal Interpretation and the
Study of Linguistic Communication, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LANGUAGE IN THE
LAW 217, 221 (2011); Stephen F. Ross, The Limited Relevance of Plain Meaning, 73 WASH.
U. L. Q. 1057, 1064–65 (1995); John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original
Methods Originalism: A New Theory of Interpretation and the Case Against Construction,
103 NW. U. L. REV. 751, 765 (2009); McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 18, at 1356–60;
see also Jim Chen, Law as a Species of Language Acquisition, WASH. U. L. Q. 1263, 1286–
87 (1995).
155
Although these same arguments can also be made about some conceptions of
ordinary meaning outside of the context of corpus linguistics, they apply with special force
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that statutory language and the language of texts found in a general corpus
have different purposes, audiences, and other linguistic characteristics, like
word choice and syntax. In other words, statutory language and nonlegal
language do not share the same context. Because of their different
contexts, interpreting statutory language according to the meaning of those
same words in nonlegal texts fails to capture meaning attributable to the
fact that the words are, in fact, found in statutes. As a result, the meaning
of statutory text cannot be equated with the meaning of nonlegal texts for
the purpose of interpreting statutes. It is therefore a mistake to interpret
terms in a statute according to the meaning of those same words found in a
general corpus.
1. Statutes and the Texts of a General Corpus Have Different
Purposes
There are many ways, at many different levels of abstraction, to
describe the purposes of statutory language.156 But, it is not necessary to
decide on the legitimacy of these purposes of statutory language, or
prioritize them, to conclude that statutory language serves different
purposes than the language found in the texts of a general corpus.157
Statutory language is authored for a different purpose than the type of
language found in a general corpus. Most obviously, statutory language is
written to prescribe behavior.158 That is, statutes are written to control

to the context of searches in general corpora to find meaning in statutory texts. Because a
search in a general corpus deliberately seeks meaning wholly outside of the legal context,
the meaning returned by such a search will fail to reflect the unique features of statutory
language.
156
Jeremy Bentham described legislation’s purpose as “the happiness of the body
politic,” which includes subsistence, abundance, equality, and security. JEREMY BENTHAM,
BENTHAM’S THEORY OF LEGISLATION 123 (Etienne Dumont ed. & trans., 1914). This is the
model of legislation that courts have in mind when they routinely uphold statutes addressing
“broad and general social or economic problem[s].” Energy Reserves Grp. v. Kan. Power
and Light, 459 U.S. 400, 411–12 (1983). Certainly, this public-regarding model of
legislation is subject to challenge: while “some legislation serves legitimate publicregarding” goals, other legislation can “only be described as amorally redistributive.”
Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory
Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 228 (1986) (citation
omitted). For example, rather than providing a rule of general applicability, special
legislation provides a rule that applies only to a particular individual, often providing special
benefits to named individuals. Evan C. Zoldan, Reviving Legislative Generality, 98 MARQ.
L. REV. 625 (2014); Evan C. Zoldan, Legislative Design and the Controllable Costs of
Special Legislation, 78 MD. L. REV. 415 (2019) [hereinafter Zoldan, Legislative Design].
157
Greenberg, supra note 154, at 233–40; cf. SLOCUM, supra note 90, at 5–6 (arguing
that communicative content of statutory language is presumptively its meaning, although
this presumption is defeasible).
158
Fiss, supra note 4, at 751; Marmor, supra note 154, at 425 (“Legal norms prescribe
modes of conduct, grant rights, [and] impose obligations . . . .”).
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conduct by providing rules of decision for individuals, administrative
agencies, and courts to follow.159 Because it is written to control conduct,
statutory language, unlike the language found in a general corpus, uses
constructions that are effective at requiring or prohibiting action or granting
authority.160 For example, statutes often prohibit conduct in the way that
the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) begins its long list of prohibited
acts: “The following acts and the causing thereof are prohibited . . . .”161
Similarly, statutes vesting authority in agencies often begin the way that the
FDCA vests rulemaking authority in the Secretary of Health and Human
Services: “[t]he authority to promulgate regulations for the efficient
enforcement of this chapter . . . is vested in the Secretary.”162
Furthermore, statutory language is written for the purpose of making
some change to the law. As a result, it is phrased to conform with
legislative drafting conventions for lawmaking.163 In Congress, for
example, the legislature must use the following language to enact a statute:
“Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of America in Congress assembled.”164 Moreover, unlike nonlegal
language, legislation is written to classify future conduct or objects. As a
result, it is written in general, prospective, impersonal language in order to
encompass both conduct that is known and conduct that is unknown.165
Again, the FDCA provides typical phrasing, prohibiting in general and
impersonal terms “the adulteration or misbranding of any food, drug,
device, tobacco product, or cosmetic . . . .”166
Because legislative drafters write language with the purpose of
accomplishing some important real-world goal, they use language to
achieve their desired results and minimize the damage of unintended
consequences.167 Sometimes, this purpose leads legislators to “seek to
achieve a high level of explicitness and thus to minimize or perhaps even

159
Marmor, supra note 154, at 425; Maurizio Gotti, Text and Genre, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF LANGUAGE AND LAW, supra note 6, at 52, 63 (noting that function of
legislative language is to “impose obligations and or confer rights”).
160
See Yon Malley, The Language of Legislation, 16 LANGUAGE & SOC’Y 28, 40
(1987).
161
21 U.S.C. § 331 (2018).
162
Id. § 371.
163
See Malley, supra note 160, at 30.
164
1 U.S.C. § 101 (2018).
165
Malley, supra note 160, at 40. Rarely, legislation is purposefully written in language
that is not general and prospective. For example, special legislation singles out a particular
individual for special treatment. See e.g. Zoldan, Legislative Design, supra note 156 at 422.
166
21 U.S.C. § 331(b).
167
Nicholas Allott & Benjamin Shaer, Inference and Intention in Legal Interpretation,
in THE PRAGMATIC TURN IN LAW 116 (Jane Giltrow et al. eds., 2017).
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eliminate implicated content . . . .”168 Conversely, statutory language can
also be unusually vague or ambiguous compared with ordinary language.169
This general principle is borne out by empirical work on Congress. In their
interviews of Capitol Hill staffers, Professors Victoria Nourse and Jane
Schachter confirmed that ambiguity or vagueness is often a feature of
legislative language, not a result of error in its drafting: where legislators
harbor different policy opinions on a key point, they often agree to use
ambiguous or vague language, each hoping that an agency or court will
later resolve the uncertainty in his favor.170
Whether unusually explicit or unusually vague, legal language is often
complex precisely because it has the purpose of addressing a complex
social issue that cannot be reduced to simple language.171 Consider the
Affordable Care Act,172 the Social Security Act,173 or countless other
transformative modern statutes. These statutes did not merely tinker with
well-known common law concepts; they completely reorganized the
relationship between the citizen and the state within their subject matters.
Complex concepts, addressed by modern legislation, cannot be expressed
in language that is simple enough for untrained people to understand while
still accomplishing what it is supposed to accomplish.174
Conversely, attempting to render statutory language into words that
can be readily grasped by a person without legal training may make a
statute ineffective.175 An example from Australia provides evidence of the
challenges legislative drafters face when trying to draft statutory language
as if it were nonlegal speech. In order to make the statute easily
understood, Australian legislative drafters wrote the Coroners Bill in
simple, nonlegal language. It did not take long, however, for lawyers and
judges to determine that there were large, unintended gaps in the law.
Moreover, many of the bill’s ramifications were not obvious from the
statute’s language, including the consequences for failing to comply with
168

Id.
SLOCUM, supra note 90, at 196–97.
170
Victoria F. Nourse & Jane S. Schachter, The Politics of Legislative Drafting: A
Congressional Case Study, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 595–96 (2002). See also Summers,
supra note 45, at 243.
171
Duncan Berry, Legislative Drafting: Could Our Statutes Be Simpler, 1987 STAT. L.
REV. 92, 93 (1987).
172
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111–148, 124 Stat. 119
(2010).
173
Social Security Act, Pub. L. No. 74–271, 49 Stat. 620 (1935).
174
Rabeea Assay, Can the Law Speak Directly to Its Subjects, 38 J. L. & SOC’Y 376,
399–401 (2011); I.M.L. Turnbull, Problems of Legislative Drafting, 1986 STAT. L. REV. 67,
68 (1986).
175
See Christopher Williams, Legal English and Plain Language: An Introduction, in
ESP ACROSS CULTURES 111, 122 (2004).
169
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the law.176
Not only is statutory language authored for a different purpose than
nonlegal language, it is also read for a different purpose than nonlegal
language. Because a reader of legislative language often has the goal of
learning what conduct is prohibited or permitted,177 an interpreter reads
statutory text for a statement of a rule, the outer limits of the application of
the rule, exceptions to the rule, similarities or differences in language
between different parts of the text, and other features that are uniquely
important for the purpose of learning what conduct is permitted or
prohibited. By contrast, a person reading a play, poem, or other nonlegal
text will not be reading it for these same purposes. As a result, a reader
will interpret a word in a nonlegal text differently than she would interpret
the very same word in a statute. As Professors McGinnis and Rappaport
described this phenomenon, legal texts are read against background
understandings about how the text should be read and interpreted.178
Moreover, this point has been demonstrated experimentally: in one study,
subjects were given a text and told that their purpose in reading it was
“studying.” Researchers determined that the subjects “employed stringent
standards focused on intratextual relations, striving for deep understanding
and coherence in their representation of the texts.”179 By contrast, subjects
tasked to read the very same texts for the purpose of “entertainment” were
“much less concerned with constructing a coherent representation of the
text itself but instead focused more on connecting text events to their own
personal experiences.”180 The study authors concluded that “when the text
genre, reading task, and/ or reader motivation varies, readers systematically
alter their criteria for comprehension and, hence, generate predictably
different patterns of inferences.”181 In other words, simply having a
different purpose leads subjects to think about, and ultimately interpret, a
text differently. Because people read statutory language for different
purposes than ordinary texts, the very same person is likely to
systematically interpret the words of statutes differently than she would
176

Berry, supra note 171, at 101.
Gustavo Arosemena, Human Rights, in INTRODUCTION TO LAW 261 (2014) (“One
natural way to look at the law is to see it as a collection of rules laid down by a competent
authority that tell us in more or less concrete terms what we should do, what is required,
prohibited and permitted.”).
178
McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 18, at 1340–41.
179
Paul Van Den Broek, Robert F. Lorch, Jr., Tracy Linderholm & Mary Gustafson,
The Effects of Readers’ Goals on Inference Generation and Memory for Texts, 29 MEMORY
& COGNITION 1081, 1085 (2001).
180
Id.
181
Id. at 1082. See also Gregory Schraw & Rayne Sperling Dennison, The Effect of
Reader Purpose on Interest and Recall, 26 J. READING BEHAV. 1, 14–15 (1994) (showing
that differences in memory and interest follow from different reading goals).
177

ZOLDAN (DO NOT DELETE)

430

11/15/2019 6:03 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50:401

interpret those same words when they are found in the texts of a general
corpus.
2. Statutes and the Texts of a General Corpus Have Different
Audiences
Texts, including statutory texts, are addressed to specific audiences.182
The texts of a general corpus, like the COCA, include transcripts of
“unscripted conversation from more than 150 different TV and radio
programs,” “[s]hort stories and plays from literary magazines, children’s
magazines,” popular magazines covering subjects as diverse as “health,
home and gardening, women, financial, religion, [and] sports,” newspapers,
and academic journals.183 The diversity of these texts suggest that, if there
is a single audience for the texts in the COCA, it is a general audience
(perhaps an audience of hypothetical reasonable people) without a single,
shared set of norms for interpreting language.184 By contrast, the audience
of statutory text always includes public officials, subject-matter experts,
lawyers, and judges, all of whom interpret law in light of their professional
roles and obligations. As a result, it should come as no surprise that
general audiences are unable to understand statutory text.
i. The Audience of Statutes Always Includes Experts
Interpreting in Their Official Capacity
The audience of statutes always includes experts who interpret
statutory language in their official capacity. First, many statutes are
addressed exclusively to users of language who have an institutional role in
the interpretation and enforcement of the statute; indeed, these statutes do
not even purport to act on individuals without an official interpretive role.
As Edward Rubin described, statutes addressed to public officials, like
regulators who supply the content of the law, dominate lawmaking.185
According to Rubin, “[m]odern legislation in its essence is an institutional
practice by which the legislature . . . issues directives to the governmental
mechanisms that implement that policy.”186 That the audience of most
modern statutes consists of government officials rather than the public in
general is most clearly true with respect to statutes that vest broad authority
182

Malley, supra note 160, at 33.
CORPUS CONTEMPORARY AM. ENG., supra note 30 (describing texts and registers).
184
Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 7, at 793.
185
Edward L. Rubin, Law and Legislation in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L.
REV. 369, 381–82, 404 (1989) (arguing that the ordinary citizen is not apprised of legal rules
“by their verbal formulation in the statute books”); Ross, supra note 154, at 1057 (noting
that non-criminal statutes are directed at “a small community of lawyers, regulators, and
people subject to their specific regulations”).
186
Rubin, supra note 185, at 372.
183
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in administrative agencies to interpret and enforce the law.187 Take, for
example, the Federal Land Policy and Management Act, which governs
how federal lands are managed. It directs federal agencies to establish
federal land leasing programs,188 maintain an inventory of public lands and
their value,189 dispose of or acquire land, and most broadly, “promulgate
rules and regulations to carry out the purposes” of the statute.190 This
statute, and countless others like it, are addressed only to institutional
actors (both lawyers and nonlawyers) who are steeped in the particular
missions and vernacular of their agencies and who read statutory language
in light of their roles, knowledge, and professional obligations. Statutory
language vesting authority in institutional actors is addressed to these
actors and reflects these roles, knowledge, and professional obligations.
These statutes epitomize the legal language that Mellinkoff argued is
“divorced from the common speech.”191
Second, even statutes that act directly on individuals without an
official interpretive role, including statutes with criminal penalties, are
often addressed primarily or exclusively to subject-matter experts. Most
saliently, a number of commentators have argued that fair notice
considerations are most acute in the context of criminal laws that act
directly on individuals.192 But, it would be too facile to conclude that a
statute has an audience of ordinary individuals rather than expert
interpreters simply because it carries criminal penalties. The FDCA, for
example, provides criminal penalties193 for the commission of a long list of
prohibited acts, including the adulteration and misbranding of food, drugs,
cosmetics, tobacco products, and medical devices.194 But, even though it
prescribes criminal penalties for its violation, the FDCA is addressed
primarily to officials of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), which is
vested with broad authority to promulgate regulations under the statute.195
Perhaps most importantly, the FDA is authorized to define, and does
define, important statutory terms, including determining what counts as
misbranding196 or adulteration.197 Even to the extent that the audience of
the FDCA includes individuals outside of the FDA, these individuals are,
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197

Id. at 381.
43 U.S.C. § 1703 (2018) (imposing obligations on agency).
Id. § 1711 (imposing obligations on agency).
Id. § 1740 (setting out rulemaking obligations).
MELLINKOFF, supra note 129, at 18.
Gries & Slocum, supra note 9, at 1427.
21 U.S.C. § 333 (2018).
Id. § 331.
Id. § 371.
E.g., 21 C.F.R. § 201.1(a) (2019).
E.g., 21 C.F.R. § 106.1(a).
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like government regulators, experts in the statutory subject-matter rather
than hypothetical reasonable people. This group includes lawyers,
lobbyists, technical experts, scientists, and compliance officers employed
by the small cohort of companies that are members of the pharmaceutical
industry.198 And the language used in the FDCA, like the language used in
most statutes, reflects the fact that its primary if not exclusive audience is
an audience of experts knowledgeable about the subject matter regulated by
the statute.
Third, even if a statute can be said to be directed to nonexpert
individuals—a situation most likely in the context of a simple rather than a
complex statute—its audience is never limited to these ordinary
individuals.199 Consider one of the simplest federal statutes, reproduced
below in full:
Whoever falsely represents himself to be an officer, agent, or
employee of the United States, and in such assumed character
arrests or detains any person or in any manner searches the
person, buildings, or property of any person, shall be fined under
this title or imprisoned not more than three years, or both.200
Because the conduct proscribed is intuitively wrong, and because it is
concisely written, perhaps this statute can fairly be characterized as having
an audience that includes ordinary people without specialized training.
Nevertheless, it would misunderstand the way the law is enforced to
conclude that its audience is limited to nonexperts. The audience of this
impersonation statute also includes: federal agents charged with enforcing
the law, lawyers in the United States Attorney’s Office who will decide
whether to prosecute an accused offender, the accused’s counsel, and the
judge who will oversee the ensuing trial. All of these actors will interpret
the statutory language in light of their background knowledge and
professional obligations. All of these experts will have at least some
specialized knowledge, which a person without special training lacks, about
the contours of what is prohibited; for example, the boundaries of what
constitutes an “arrest” or a “search” are notoriously technical.201 Moreover,
the judges and lawyers interpreting this statute will be constrained to
interpret this language in accordance with professional standards and
198

Ross, supra note 154, at 1061–62.
MELLINKOFF, supra note 129, at 17–18; William N. Eskridge & Judith N. Levi,
Regulatory Variables and Statutory Interpretation, 73 WASH. U. L. Q. 1103, 1010–11
(1995); Victoria F. Nourse, Misunderstanding Congress: Statutory Interpretation, the
Supermajoritarian Difficulty, and the Separation of Powers, 99 GEO. L.J. 1119, 1142
(2011); Mattila, supra note 129, at 31.
200
18 U.S.C. § 913 (2018).
201
Schauer, supra note 131, at 7–8 (noting that words like search and seizure have legal
meanings that are both over- and under-inclusive of their ordinary meaning).
199
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ethical obligations that bind lawyers and judges. Finally, these expert
interpreters will need some knowledge of the broader legal regime in order
to cross-reference this statute with other statutes to learn what fine might be
applicable. Similarly, all statutes that are addressed to individuals
untrained in the law are also addressed to those with legal or subject-matter
training who will interpret the statute in light of their expertise and
professional obligations.202
ii. Nonexpert Audiences Do Not Understand Legal Language
Perhaps the best evidence that statutory language has a different
audience than the type of language found in a general corpus is the
enduring difficulty that writers and speakers of legal language encounter
when attempting to communicate with those not versed in the law.203 Legal
language, including statutory language, has long been criticized as being
unintelligible to those untrained in the law. It has been called “elitist,
bloated, and filled with gobbledygook” and “too dense and clouded for
laypersons to understand.”204 Even undoubtedly sophisticated readers like
Swift, Dickens, Jefferson, and Bentham all have criticized legal language
as unintelligible.205
The unintelligibility of legal English is not a new phenomenon—for
peculiar historical reasons, there has “never been a time since the Norman
Conquest when the English of the law has been in tune with the common
usage. It has always been considered a language apart.”206 But, although
the reasons for the distinctiveness of legal English are ancient, “the gap
between legal discourse and everyday discourse is still very wide. Present
day legal discourse retains its identity as a highly specialised and
distinctive discourse type or genre of English.”207 Jurors, for example, do
not understand jury instructions, even when they think that they do,208
202

MELLINKOFF, supra note 129, at 17–18 (discussing words that have special meanings
to lawyers trained in the law); Marmor, supra note 154, at 437 (“[T]he legislature
deliberately speaks with several voices.”). Many of the arguments about audience can be
made, perhaps with greater force, about interpretation of agency regulations. Even more so
than statutes, regulations are usually addressed to industry insiders, defining statutory
language that is itself directed to agency and industry insiders, and which draw on complex
statutory and regulatory history.
203
JOHN GIBBONS, LANGUAGE AND THE LAW 13 (John Gibbons ed., 1994); McGinnis &
Rappaport, supra note 18, at 1338–39.
204
Soha Turfler, Language Ideology and the Plain Language Movement: How StraightTalkers Sell Linguistic Myths, 12 LEGAL COMM. & RHETORIC 195, 196 (2015).
205
Williams, supra note 175, at 116.
206
GIBBONS, supra note 203, at 11–12. See also Williams, supra note 175, at 116.
207
GIBBONS, supra note 203, at 13.
208
Bradley Saxton, How Well Do Jurors Understand Jury Instructions? A Field Test
Using Real Juries and Real Trials in Wyoming, 33 LAND & WATER L. REV. 59, 67 (1998)
(collecting and describing studies about jury comprehension); Walter W. Steele Jr. &
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because jury instructions use “legal phrases and concepts that are foreign to
the layperson.”209 Translators have found that translating legal texts is
unlike translating nonlegal language. Because legal language is “complex
and highly technical,” “legal translation is generally recognized as the most
complex and demanding of all areas of specialized translation.”210 As a
consequence, it is not sufficient for legal translators to have language
proficiency; they also must have “considerable specialist knowledge of
both the source and target legal systems.”211 And the persistent
unintelligibility of legal language to nonlawyers has given birth to “plain
language” movements, both in the United States and abroad, which are
dedicated to making legal language accessible to nonlegal audiences.212
Despite some successes in the area of consumer contracts and agency
guidance materials,213 however, these efforts have not had an impact on
legislative drafting in the United States.214
Of all legal language, statutory language has been called the most
complex and esoteric, rendering it “incomprehensible to all except the
specialist reader.”215 The influential Renton Committee, convened by the
British Parliament to study statutory language, concluded that statutory
language was impenetrable to ordinary citizens and might “as well be
written in a foreign language.”216 Finally, and most tellingly, government
entities themselves have acknowledged that they cannot communicate
Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Jury Instructions: A Persistent Failure to Communicate, 67 N.C. L.
REV. 77, 81 (1988).
209
Nancy Marder, Instructing the Jury, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LANGUAGE AND
LAW, supra note 6, at 435, 439–40.
210
Susan Šarčević, Challenges to the Legal Translator, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
LANGUAGE AND LAW, supra note 6, at 187, 189.
211
Id. Similarly, as McGinnis and Rappaport have suggested, nonlawyers recognize
when they are reading legal language and defer to expert opinions, that is, lawyers, about it.
McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 154, at 765.
212
Mark Adler, The Plain Language Movement, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
LANGUAGE AND LAW, supra note 6, at 67, 82–83. Congress also acknowledged the need for
a “plain language” movement when it enacted the Plain Writing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No.
111-274, 124 Stat. 2861 (2010) (requiring agencies to issue documents in plain language).
213
Plain Writing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111–274, 124 Stat. 2861 (2010). The Plain
Writing Act requires agencies to write plainly and report back to Congress with the results
of their efforts to do so. It also requires the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to
provide guidance to agencies to fulfill their statutory obligations. OMB directed agencies to
a set of guidelines created by an organization called PLAIN, which provides guidance on
writing for the intended audience and avoiding unnecessarily complicated language or legal,
foreign, or technical jargon. See, e.g., Rachel Stabler, What We’ve Got Here Is a Failure to
Communicate: The Plain Writing Act of 2010, 40 J. LEGIS. 280, 294–95 (2014).
214
See Williams, supra note 175, at 117–19.
215
GIBBONS, supra note 203, at 25.
216
DAVID RENTON, PARLIAMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM, THE PREPARATION OF
LEGISLATION: REPORT OF A COMMITTEE APPOINTED BY THE LORD PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL
37 (1975).
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statutory obligations effectively to their citizens through statutory language.
Instead, it is common for government entities to provide the public with
summaries of statutes or regulations as a means of educating them about
the law’s requirements.217
These publications summarize statutory
language in narrative form or as bullet points or FAQs, provide rough
definitions of legal terms, give examples to explain the intended meaning
of statutory language, and even demonstrate statutory meaning with charts
or pictures.218 To take just one example that includes many of these
features, the United States Occupational Safety and Health Administration
publishes a workers’ rights pamphlet directed to nonlegal audiences,
including summaries of statutes, rough definitions, examples, and narrative
language, all intended to provide guidance in nonlegal language.219
3. Statutes Have Different Linguistic Characteristics than the
Texts of a General Corpus
Because the purpose and audience of statutory language are different
than that of language found in the texts of a general corpus, it is not
surprising that statutory language has different linguistic characteristics
than nonlegal language.220 First, legal texts use words in unordinary ways.
They contain “word usages that have no parallel in ordinary
conversation,”221 like interplead and demurrer. Legal language also
preserves words and constructions that were once common in nonlegal
speech but that are no longer current,222 like therefor, whereas, and “comes
now the plaintiff.” Moreover, legal English contains frequent traces of

217

A special thanks to Larry Solan for suggesting this line of inquiry.
See Nicholas R. Parrillo, Federal Agency Guidance and the Power to Bind: An
Empirical Study of Agencies and Industries, 36 YALE J. ON REG. 165, 167 (2018)
(“Guidance comes in an endless variety of labels and formats, depending on the agency:
advisories, circulars, bulletins, memos, interpretive letters, enforcement manuals, fact
sheets, FAQs, highlights, you name it.”).
219
U.S. DEP’T LAB. OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMIN., WORKERS’ RIGHTS
OSHA 3021-06R (2017), https://www.osha.gov/Publications/osha3021.pdf. See also MICH.
LEGISLATURE, A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR TENANTS & LANDLORDS (2017), https://www.legisla
ture.mi.gov/Publications/tenantlandlord.pdf (providing a plain language “practical guide”
for tenants and landlords designed to “inform tenants and landlords about their rights and
responsibilities in rental relationships”).
220
In more technical language, linguists might describe the different genres, registers, or
domains that these different types of text occupy. David Y. W. Lee, Genres, Registers, Text
Types, Domains, and Styles: Clarifying the Concepts and Navigating a Path Through the
BNC Jungle, 5 LANGUAGE, LEARNING, AND TECH. 37, 37–41 (2001). See Tiersma, supra
note 153, at 27–28 (noting that law is replete with technical vocabulary, archaic, formal and
unusual terminology, and unusual grammatical constructions). See also Williams, supra
note 175, at 112–13 (noting presence in legal language of foreign words and phrases).
221
McGreal, supra note 46, at 326. See also Tiersma, supra note 153, at 27–28.
222
MELLINKOFF, supra note 129, at 12–13; Mattila, supra note 128, at 32.
218
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Latin and law French,223 like fee simple and ab initio. Harder to spot, but
no more intelligible than these foreign or archaic words, is legal language’s
frequent use of specialized terms and legal jargon,224 like “four corners of
the complaint,” “lower court,” and “damages.”
Most commonly, and most relevant to the purposes of this Article,
legal language uses common terms, but gives them meanings different
from, and sometimes even at odds with, the same words as used in nonlegal
speech.225 As Mellinkoff described, legal language is characterized by the
“frequent use of common words with uncommon meanings,”226 like claim
and discovery. It is this kind of language that creates the greatest risk of
confusion when nonlawyers interact with the legal system. Whether words
like “seizure,”227 “reckless,”228 “utter,”229 and “consideration”230 are used in
a legal sense or nonlegal sense makes all the difference to whether one’s
rights have been violated or whether one is liable for punitive damages, has
committed a crime, or has enforceable contract rights.
The differences between legal language and nonlegal language are
more than just differences in vocabulary. Indeed, it is the differences in
syntax and drafting conventions that “render[s] legislative texts
incomprehensible to all except the specialist reader . . . .”231 Legal
language is more complex232 and reflects a different “structure and
arrangement of principal sentence elements” than nonlegal language.233
Sentence length234 and clause structure235 also differ between legal and
nonlegal language. Moreover, legal language uses polysemes (words or
223

MELLINKOFF, supra note 129, at 13–15.
Id. at 17–19.
225
Schauer, supra note 154, at 35-36 (many “legal” words also have ordinary meanings
that are different than legal meaning); Poscher, supra note 131, at 132; Mattila, supra note
129, at 31 (“the use of ordinary words in a technical legal sense is particularly widespread”);
Schauer, supra note 131, at 7–8 (words like search and seizure have legal meanings that are
both over and under-inclusive of their ordinary meaning).
226
MELLINKOFF, supra note 129, at 11–12.
227
See 5 U.S.C. § 5545(a)(2)(A) (2018) (setting out obligation of federal officer to
possess knowledge of “court decisions concerning . . . search and seizure”).
228
See 30 U.S.C. § 1235(l) (2018) (defining gross negligence to include “reckless”
behavior).
229
See 18 U.S.C. § 331 (2018) (imposing criminal liability for a person who “utters” an
altered, defaced, or mutilated coin).
230
See 31 U.S.C. § 3727(d) (2018) (providing circumstances under which a contract
may be changed without “consideration”).
231
GIBBONS, supra note 203, at 25.
232
Gotti, supra note 159, at 53.
233
Risto Hiltunen, The Grammar and Structure of Legal Texts, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF LANGUAGE AND LAW, supra note 6, at 39, 41.
234
Hiltunen, supra note 233, at 42; Gotti, supra note 159, at 53–54.
235
Hiltunen, supra note 233, at 43; Gotti, supra note 159, at 53.
224
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phrases with different, but related senses) with greater frequency than
nonlegal language.236 At times, legal language can be unusually precise,237
painstakingly including contextual knowledge that would be assumed in
nonlegal speech.238 Other times, legal language is unusually vague,239
perhaps because legislators seek agreement on language even when they
cannot agree on its meaning.240 It is these variations from nonlegal syntax
that serve “to distinguish the language of the law from the common
tongue.”241
Nonlegal language also has different drafting conventions than legal
language. For example, as Tiersma described, nonlegal English often
replaces a repeated noun with a pronoun; writers of legal language, by
contrast, tend to repeat the noun. For example, it is common in legal
English to write “Buyer promises that Buyer will pay,” when one means
that the same person is doing the promising and buying. By contrast, if a
nonlegal English speaker writes “‘John kissed John’s girlfriend,’ we
normally assume that there are two distinct people named John.”242
Statutory language also abides by the convention of placing multiple
related thoughts in the same sentence. This convention results in sentences
that can run hundreds of words and is responsible for the tightly-packed
character of statutory language.243
Third, although many of the above-described differences in word
choice and syntax apply equally to statutory and non-statutory legal
language, statutory language is especially different from the kind of
language found in a general corpus. One reason is that the texts of a
general corpus include transcripts of spoken language, which is
fundamentally different from written language. One-fifth of the COCA
consists of “unscripted conversation from more than 150 different TV and
radio programs.”244 But, there are “fundamental differences between the
interpretation of verbal utterances and texts.”245 Among other differences,
oral interlocutors share time and space, creating a great deal of shared
context that does not appear in the words themselves.246 For this reason,
236

Mattila, supra note 129, at 30.
MELLINKOFF, supra note 129, at 21–22.
238
Marmor, supra note 154, at 425; Allott & Shaer, supra note 167, at 115–16.
239
Poscher, supra note 131, at 134.
240
William N. Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479,
1532 (1986–87); Nourse & Schachter, supra note 170, at 595–96.
241
MELLINKOFF, supra note 128, at 23.
242
Tiersma, supra note 153, at 30.
243
GIBBONS, supra note 203, at 25.
244
CORPUS CONTEMPORARY AM. ENG., supra note 30.
245
SLOCUM, supra note 90, at 43.
246
SLOCUM, supra note 90, at 43–50.
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Professor Brian Slocum notes that “ordinary conversations are a poor
model for the interpretation of legal texts because the context of
interpretation of oral statements differs so greatly from the context of
interpretation of legal texts.”247
In addition, statutory language is special, even when compared with
other legal language. As Tiersma notes, statutory language has “its own
relatively rigid format and sometimes requires specific forms of
language.”248 As a result, even when concluding that legal English as a
whole is not a distinct language from nonlegal English, Tiersma notes that
the two are most similar when nonlegal English is rendered in highly
formal, written prose. The formality of some nonlegal English, however,
stands in sharp contrast with even the written texts of a general corpus.
The COCA, for example, includes not only spoken language, but informal
written speech, like the text of children’s magazines.249 The NOW Corpus
contains not only news sources, but also online magazines with subjects as
diverse as video games, cricket, and fashion from speech communities
markedly different from the United States.250 And the COHA includes,
among other texts, movie scripts and poetry.251 Because a general corpus
includes spoken and informal written language, and because of the special
nature of statutes, whatever similarities there are between legal English and
nonlegal English more generally, statutory language and the language of
the texts of a general corpus are considerably less similar.
4. A General Corpus Should Not Be Used to Interpret Statutory
Language
It is never appropriate to search for statutory meaning in a general
corpus. As described above, statutory language and the language found in
a general corpus differ in purpose, audience, and linguistic characteristics.
In other words, statutory language and the texts of a general corpus do not
share the same context. As a result, an interpretation of a statute according
to the meaning of language in a general corpus is lacking the statutory
context that is necessary to understand statutory meaning.
An
interpretation of a statute without statutory context, in other words, fails to
reflect the meaning attributable to the fact that a statute is statutory
language as opposed to a novel, poem, or some other nonstatutory text.252
247

SLOCUM, supra note 90, at 14; see also Tiersma, supra note 153, at 27; Allott &
Shaer, supra note 167, at 115–16; Gillian Brown, Understanding Spoken Language, 12
TESOL Q. 271 (1994).
248
Tiersma, supra note 153, at 30.
249
CORPUS CONTEMPORARY AM. ENG., supra note 30.
250
NOW CORPUS (NEWS ON THE WEB), supra note 115.
251
CORPUS HISTORICAL AM. ENG., supra note 115.
252
For a contrary view, see Brian G. Slocum, Pragmatics and Legal Texts: How Best to
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Moreover, the differences between statutory language and nonlegal
language are pervasive rather than exceptional. That is, the differences
described above suggest that statutory language is something other than
nonlegal language sprinkled with occasional legal terms of art. Instead, it
makes more sense to think of statutes as written in a different dialect or
sublanguage—statutory language—albeit one that contains both words that
differ obviously from their use in nonlegal language and also words that
mean the same thing as their cognates in nonlegal language.253
Consider the following non-statutory text:
(1) When I lived in London, I rented a flat overlooking the
Thames.
Here, the word “flat” is used differently than Americans would use that
word. When reading (1), an American reader would simply substitute the
word “apartment” for “flat” and read the rest of the sentence without much
effort. Nevertheless, it does not follow that the sentence is written in
American English with one word, flat, written in British English. Instead,
depending on the context of the utterance (including the purpose, audience,
and surrounding texts), it might make more sense to conclude that the
whole sentence is written in British English, a separate dialect with many
cognates in American English. Similarly, it would be a mistake to read a
statute and conclude, because much of it can be read with little effort, that
it is written in nonlegal language except for the few words that appear to be
legal terms of art.254 Better, for all the reasons described above, statutory
text should be considered a dialect of natural language (or a “sublanguage,”
as Tiersma put it),255 statutory language, whose meaning cannot be
determined simply by importing the meaning of its words from nonlegal
Account for the Gap Between Literal Meaning and Communicative Meaning, in THE
PRAGMATIC TURN IN LAW: INFERENCE AND INTERPRETATION IN LEGAL DISCOURSE 140 (Janet
Giltrow & Dieter Stein eds., 2017) (disagreeing with the proposition that “the draftors of
legal texts, particularly statutes, do not use language in the same ways as do others, and that
these differences preclude the applicability of conversational implicatures.”). See also
Fallon, supra note 151, at 331–33 (arguing that legal language is not a language in the same
sense as natural language); Summers, supra note 45, at 234 (arguing that interpreting
statutory language does not require a person to “leave the world of ordinary language and
enter a specialized legal world governed by some special tongue”).
253
Schauer, supra note 131, at 19–20. See also McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 18,
at 1377 (arguing that the structure of a document, not simply its words, determine whether it
is written in technical or ordinary language).
254
Tiersma, supra note 153, at 29 (it “would be the wrong lesson to draw” that “legal
language is nothing more than ordinary English with a lot of specialized vocabulary”).
255
Tiersma, supra note 153, at 31. Cf. Fallon, supra note 151, at 331–32. Fallon argues,
quite reasonably, that legal language is not independent of natural language and does not
share its status as an independent language. But, simply because legal English differs from
spoken English less than, say, French, it does not follow that legal English is similar to
spoken English in a way that is relevant to statutory interpretation.
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texts. Instead, a statute should be read as statutory language, with all of the
distinctive features of this language, including its unique purposes,
audience, word choice, syntax, and other conventions.256
Interpreted in this manner, the meaning of statutory language is
always a distinctively legal meaning. In some cases, giving the words in a
statute their legal meaning yields the same interpretation as giving its
words their nonlegal meaning; in other cases, recognizing the
distinctiveness of statutory language leads to a different interpretation.
Either way, a reader who interprets statutory language as something distinct
from nonlegal language recognizes that the project of interpreting legal
language is not just one of translating individual technical words and
phrases and inserting them into an otherwise nonlegal text. By contrast,
when users of corpus linguistics techniques search for statutory meaning in
general corpora, they risk missing the meaning that is attributable to the
statutory context. As a result, corpus users, in a real sense, misconstrue the
language of the text they interpret.257 Because it is an error to interpret
even nontechnical statutory language according to its nonlegal meaning, it
is never appropriate to search in a general corpus for statutory meaning.
The distinction between nonlegal meaning and statutory meaning
leads to one final point: it is possible to reject the claim that statutory
language should be interpreted according to its nonlegal meaning and still
accept the claim that statutory language should be interpreted according to
its ordinary meaning, properly understood.258 This is true because ordinary
meaning is not synonymous with nonlegal meaning. As Professor David
Strauss has noted, the ordinary meaning of statutory language “is not so
ordinary.” Rather, it is better thought of as “ordinary legal meaning,” as
distinguished from ordinary (nonlegal) meaning.259 Consider, for example,
a prohibition on “uttering” in a statute concerning securities fraud. The
ordinary meaning of a prohibition on “uttering” in a statute about securities

256
Schauer, supra note 131, at 19–20. See also Fiss, supra note 4, at 744 (arguing that
an interpreter is constrained by “a set of rules that specify the relevance and weight to be
assigned to the material”).
257
To be clear, I am not suggesting that statutory language is a literally a distinct
language from ordinary English. As Schauer sensibly noted, “[l]egal English is related to
ordinary English in ways that Estonian is not.” Schauer, supra note 154, at 36. But, the
differences are clear enough to justify Tiersma’s judgment that legal language is a
“sublanguage” of English, falling “somewhere between a separate language and ordinary
English.” Tiersma, supra note 153, at 31.
258
Frederick Schauer, Statutory Construction and the Coordinating Function of Plain
Meaning, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 234, 234 n.6 (noting that it is “implausible” that plain
meaning “must necessarily be the same as ordinary non-technical meaning”).
259
Strauss, supra note 154 at 1568. Cf. SLOCUM, supra note 90, at 12–13, 179–80
(distinguishing ordinary legal meaning from ordinary meaning).
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fraud includes passing off a worthless check as genuine,260 including
handing a counterfeit check to a bank cashier.261 By contrast, an
interpretation of the term “utter” according to its nonlegal meaning (that is,
the meaning found in a general corpus), would attribute to it a meaning
involving making a sound with one’s voice or perhaps a meaning involving
completeness or totality.262 As this example demonstrates, the ordinary
meaning of a statutory term can differ from its nonlegal meaning. Because
nonlegal meaning is not coextensive with ordinary meaning, rejecting the
use of corpus linguistics for statutory interpretation does not entail rejecting
the common preference for interpreting texts according to their ordinary
meaning.263
This section has described the subjective and nontrivial choice that a
user of corpus linguistics techniques makes when choosing a corpus to
search for statutory meaning. The choice is subjective because corpus
users do not adhere to standards for choosing a corpus and perhaps cannot
articulate a persuasive test distinguishing between ordinary terms and legal
terms of art. Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, it is never
appropriate for a user of corpus linguistics for statutory interpretation to
rely on a general corpus. Because legal language is different than nonlegal
language—in purpose, audience, word choice, syntax, and drafting
conventions—the meaning of statutory language is not the same, in a
relevant way, as the meaning of cognate words found in a general corpus.
C. Is a “Legal Corpus” the Answer?
Because the use of corpus linguistics techniques for statutory
interpretation has focused, virtually exclusively, on searches in general
corpora, the mismatch between statutory language and nonlegal language is
the most pressing theoretical problem facing courts and commentators
relying on corpus techniques to interpret statutes. In response to these
problems, one might suggest that a “legal corpus” could be constructed—
that is—a corpus populated by legal texts rather than nonlegal texts.264
260
18 U.S.C. § 513 (2018) (penalizing a person who “utters or possesses a counterfeited
security . . . [or who] makes, utters or possesses a forged security . . . with intent to deceive
another person”). United States v. Peters, 462 F.3d 953, 959 (8th Cir. 2003) (upholding
conviction for “uttering” where defendant “deposited, and substantially spent, a check that
he knew was counterfeit into his bank account”).
261
Peters, 462 F.3d at 953.
262
A search for “utter” in the COCA, for example, returns many hits that reflect these
nonlegal meanings. CORPUS CONTEMPORARY AM. ENG., supra note 30 (search for “utter”).
263
E.g., Eskridge, supra note 43, at 538–39.
264
Phillips, Ortner & Lee, supra note 8, at 24. See also Solan, supra note 42, at 59–60
(noting that searching a corpus designed to reflect ordinary meaning is not very useful for
determining the meaning of terms of art). Cf. Heilpern, supra note 128, at 380 (suggesting
that technical terms of art—but not legal terms of art—should be interpreted according to
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Even if it is inappropriate to interpret statutes according to their nonlegal
meaning, the argument might go, this is not a problem with corpus
linguistics techniques per se, but rather with the choice of corpus. A corpus
user, therefore, could search a legal corpus to interpret statutory language,
eliminating the problems associated with nonlegal language. Even on its
face, however, this response is inadequate to eliminate the subjectivity
inherent in corpus use. Because legal terms cannot be separated neatly
from nonlegal terms in the same text, the “difference between legal terms
and words of ordinary language is relative and hard to define.”265 As a
result, a corpus user would have no objective way to choose between a
legal corpus and general corpus for many statutory terms. The construction
of a legal corpus, therefore, would not eliminate the subjectivity of the
choice of corpus.
Even assuming that there is a way to distinguish legal words from
nonlegal words sufficient to meet this objection, there are a number of
other reasons why a search in a legal corpus cannot help uncover
interpretations of statutory language objectively. First, even if a corpus
user determined that a statutory term should be given its legal meaning,
words used in statutory language often have more than one legal meaning.
A “claim” means something wholly different in the context of patent
law,266 civil procedure,267 and government contracts.268 And “discharge” of
a firearm269 is not the same as the “discharge” of a pollutant270 or discharge

meaning found in technical documents).
265
Mattila, supra note 129, at 31. See also TIERSMA, supra note 129, at 108 (the
distinction between terms of art and legal jargon “is mainly one of degree”); MELLINKOFF,
supra note 129, at 17.
266
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 373–74 (1996)
(“[A] patent includes one or more claims, which particularly poin[t] out and distinctly
clai[m] the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention. A claim covers and
secures a process, a machine, a manufacture, a composition of matter, or a design, but never
the function or result of either, nor the scientific explanation of their operation.
The claim define[s] the scope of a patent grant, and functions to forbid not only exact copies
of an invention, but products that go to the heart of an invention but avoids the literal
language of the claim by making a noncritical change.”) (internal citations and quotes
omitted).
267
A claim is a set of facts for which the law provides redress, an innovation in civil
procedure designed to avoid “the unfortunate rigidity and confusion surrounding the words
cause of action.” 5 FED. PRAC. & PROC. CIV. § 1216 (3d ed.).
268
31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2018) (“[C]laim . . . means any request or demand, whether under
a contract or otherwise, for money or property and whether or not the United States has title
to the money or property, that is presented to an officer, employee, or agent of the United
States.”).
269
State v. Rasabout, 356 P.3d 1258, 1261 (Utah 2015) (Lee, J., concurring) (“the
allowable unit of prosecution for unlawful discharge of a firearm is each discrete shot”).
270
33 U.S.C. § 1362(12) (2018) (“discharge of a pollutant” means “any addition of any
pollutant to navigable waters from any point source . . . .”).
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from the hospital.271 Each of these terms has multiple distinct meanings; as
a result, searching for the meaning of any of these terms in a legal corpus
would provide no more precision than consulting a legal dictionary and do
nothing to reduce the subjectivity of the choice.272 Take, for example, the
use of the term “claim” in the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act
(FERA). FERA amended the False Claims Act (FCA), retroactively, to
include “all claims under the False Claims Act” pending as of a given
date.273 On one hand, the “claims” referred to in FERA might be the type
of claims that are the subject of the FCA, that is, demands for money from
the federal Treasury.274 On the other hand, FERA’s “claims” might refer to
lawsuits by the government under the FCA, that is, the civil procedure
meaning of the term.275 The difference between these two interpretations
has real-world significance because each interpretation reaches a different
set of cases. Nevertheless, results returned by a search in a legal corpus
would shed no light on which of these two distinct meanings is the meaning
of “claims” in FERA.
Second, a possible response to the problem of multiple legal meanings
would be to construct multiple subject-matter-specific legal corpora.276 For
example, if a lawyer was interpreting the term “discharge” in an
environmental case, the argument might go, she could simply search an
environmental law corpus rather than a criminal law corpus for the term.
But, multiple subject-matter-specific corpora would not help a corpus user
interpret a statute in an objective way. This proposed solution presupposes
that there are relatively firm legal categories, like “environmental law” and
“criminal law”; but, of course, legal categories are not nearly as distinct as
this proposed response suggests. For example, “discharge” of a pollutant is
an environmental crime.277 There is not, therefore, a firm line between
hypothetical environmental and criminal corpora. Similarly, there is not a

271
United States ex rel. Worthy v. E. Me. Healthcare Sys., No. 2:14-CV-00184-JAW,
2017 WL 211609, at *8 (D. Me. 2017) (noting different types of hospital discharge statuses,
each requiring different codes).
272
Moreover, both common law and civil law traditions have terms of art, but their
drafting conventions, resulting from their different histories, are different. Gotti, supra note
159, at 58.
273
Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. 111-21, § 4(f), 123 Stat.
1617, 1625 (2009) (emphasis added).
274
Matthew Titolo, Retroactivity and the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009,
86 IND. L.J. 258, 268–69 (2011).
275
Id.; Sanders v. Allison Engine Co., 703 F.3d 930, 937 (6th Cir. 2012).
276
Cf. Heilpern, supra note 128, at 380 (suggesting that technical terms of art—but not
legal terms of art—should be interpreted according to meaning found in technical
documents).
277
33 U.S.C. § 1311 (2018) (prohibiting discharge of effluent); id. § 1319 (providing
criminal penalties for discharge of effluent).
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firm line between other hypothetical subject-matter-specific legal corpora.
Moreover, even if an interpreter were certain about which legal corpus
to choose, a search in a subject-matter-specific legal corpus provides no
way to choose among closely related legal meanings of words, all of which
would be found in the same subject matter corpus. Polysemes—words or
phrases with different, but related senses—occur frequently in legal
language.278 Because they are closely related, legal polysemes would be
found in the same specialized legal corpus. As a result, choosing a
particular subject-matter-specific legal corpus would do nothing to help
determine which of two related possible meanings is the meaning of a
statutory term.
Consider, for example, the ubiquitous legal term
“jurisdiction.” It can refer to the particular physical territory where a body
of law governs (like Congress’s exclusive jurisdiction over the District of
Columbia),279 the power of the court to exercise authority over particular
types of disputes (subject matter jurisdiction),280 the power of the court to
exercise authority over a particular individual (personal jurisdiction),281 or
the power of the court to hear a case in a particular procedural posture
(original vs. appellate jurisdiction).282 Because these polysemes would all
likely be in the same hypothetical subject-matter-specific corpus, the
construction of subject-matter-specific corpora would not help an
interpreter choose an interpretation objectively.
V. SUBJECTIVITY AND CORPUS USAGE REVISITED
Part IV identified the choice of corpus as a key point in the
interpretive process at which corpus users must make a subjective choice.
Because the stated goal of corpus users is to reduce subjectivity,
recognizing the subjectivity of the use of corpus linguistics in statutory
interpretation should give legal interpreters pause before they adopt corpus
methods for an interpretive decision. This Part will make the stronger
claim that corpus use for statutory interpretation, as described above, is
subjective in the same way as the interpretive methods that corpus users
criticize. This demonstration suggests that corpus methods do not add
value to the interpretive process at all.
Specifically, this Part will connect the types of subjectivity identified
by proponents of corpus linguistics with the types of subjectivity that attach
to corpus use itself. As Part III showed, proponents of corpus linguistics
techniques for statutory interpretation roundly criticize two main sources of
278
279
280
281
282

Mattila, supra note 129, at 30.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17.
E.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2018).
E.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k).
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.

ZOLDAN (DO NOT DELETE)

2019]

11/15/2019 6:03 PM

THE DREAM OF OBJECTIVITY

445

subjectivity: reliance on the intuition of the interpreter and reliance on
biased reference data. In order to evaluate corpus users’ claim that corpus
use is less subjective than other methods of interpretation, this Part will
compare the subjectivity of corpus analysis with corpus users’ critiques of
other methods of interpretation. The comparison demonstrates that the
subjectivity of the choice of corpus identified in Part IV is also rooted in
the intuition of the interpreter and in reliance on biased reference data.
This conclusion undercuts the claim that corpus linguistics is more
objective than the methods of interpretation it critiques.
A. Intuition and Corpus Linguistics
A choice of corpus relies on an intuition about what kind of word is
being interpreted—that is—whether the word is an ordinary term or, by
contrast, a specialized legal term. As noted, corpus users have not
articulated, and likely cannot articulate, a persuasive account describing
when a word is a legal term of art rather than an ordinary term. 283
Nevertheless, users of corpus techniques regularly conclude, without
analysis, that terms like “results in,”284 “information,”285 and “harbor”286 are
ordinary words rather than legal terms. In the absence of an explanation,
and given the lack of a pattern of use that would suggest the application of
a standard,287 it appears that it is the interpreters’ intuition, rather than any
theory or replicable data, that is being consulted to make this ordinariness
determination.
Moreover, even when corpus users acknowledge that some words are
terms of art, they rely on their intuition to determine that a particular word
is ordinary. Consider again the Rasabout case, in which Justice Lee
criticized the majority for relying on intuition to determine that the
statutory term “discharge” roughly means “shoot.”288 Lee argued that the
equation of discharge with shoot may be correct, but it is based on intuition
rather than data.289 But, the same can be said for Lee’s determination that
“discharge” is an ordinary term rather than a term of art. Rather than
offering a reason why discharge is an ordinary word, he gave only a reason
for not considering the question. Specifically, he noted that “no one has
proffered the view that discharge is a legal term of art subject to
283

See Part IV.A.
Wilson v. Safelite Grp., Inc., 930 F.3d 429, 439, 440 (6th Cir. 2019) (Thapar, J.,
concurring).
285
People v. Harris, 885 N.W.2d 832, 839 n.33 (Mich. 2016).
286
Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 7, at 812.
287
In re Adoption of Baby E.Z., 266 P.3d 702, 724 (Utah 2011) (searching the COCA
after identifying a word as a term of art).
288
State v. Rasabout, 356 P.3d 1258, 1274–75 (Utah 2015) (Lee, J., concurring).
289
Id. at 1274–75.
284
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specialized meaning in the law. Everyone agrees that this term is being
used in its ordinary sense.”290 In other words, Lee relied on his own
intuition (along with the intuition of the majority) to conclude that
“discharge” was used in its ordinary sense. But, aggregated intuitions, like
anecdotes, are not data. Lee’s intuition may be “correct” in the sense that it
matched the unverified intuition of others, but it is no more rooted in
objective data than the interpretation he criticized.291
B. Biased Reference Data and Corpus Linguistics
The choice of a general corpus for statutory interpretation entails the
reliance on biased reference data. A general corpus, as described above, is
designed to represent nonspecialized speech by containing texts that use
language in nonspecialized circumstances.292 The COCA’s 560 million
words, for example, include transcriptions of spoken language, fiction,
popular magazines, newspaper articles, and the like.293 The use of
language in a general corpus is biased with respect to statutory language
because it shares none of the same context—that is, purpose, audience,
word choice, and syntax—as statutory language.
To make this point clear, consider corpus users’ criticism of
dictionary use for statutory interpretation. Corpus users criticize dictionary
use for statutory interpretation purposes because dictionaries lack the
context of ordinary language.294 By providing definitions of words without
accompanying context, they argue, dictionaries systematically underreport
ordinary uses of words. This flaw, corpus users suggest, biases dictionaries
in favor of atypical usages, leaving even the good-faith interpreter unable
to rely on dictionary usage without the risk of reaching atypical results.295
But, if the dictionary’s disease is its lack of context, the corpus cure is

290

Id. at 1287.
Similarly, in the context of constitutional interpretation, Phillips, Ortner, and Lee
assert that “corruption of blood” is a legal term of art while “commerce” is an ordinary
word. Phillips, Ortner & Lee, supra note 8, at 24. Their only explanation for why
“commerce” is an ordinary word is that “it makes no sense, and completely undermines the
premise of ordinary public meaning, to argue that because a word or phrase is used in a legal
document it automatically has a specialized legal sense.” Id. This explanation, even if true,
indicates only that not every word in a legal document is a term of art. It does not describe
why commerce is ordinary, a conclusion that appears based on intuition rather than
objective data. See also Ilya Somin, Originalism and Political Ignorance, 97 MINN. L. REV.
625, 651–52 (2012) (noting that terms like Bill of Attainder, privileges and immunities, and
corruption of blood are terms of art, but words like liberty, property, and commerce are
ordinary words).
292
Gries & Slocum, supra note 9, at 1441; Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 7, at 828–29.
293
CORPUS CONTEMPORARY AM. ENG., supra note 30.
294
Gries & Slocum, supra note 9, at 1441.
295
See, e.g., Craig v. Provo, 389 P.3d 423, 428 n.3.
291
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worse. By relying on words in a general corpus, a corpus user will
interpret statutory language as if it were used in the same types of contexts
as spoken language, newspaper articles, poetry, screen plays, magazines,
and the like. Because statutory language is written and read for different
purposes, reflects different audiences, and has different linguistic
characteristics than nonlegal language, interpreting statutory language by
reference to the use of words in nonlegal language does not place statutory
language in context. Rather, corpus use is radically acontextual, divorcing
statutory language from its distinctly legal context and guaranteeing
interpretations that do not reflect the unique characteristics of statutory
language.296
Indeed, the radical acontextuality that comes from interpreting
statutory language as nonlegal language has been expressly embraced by
corpus users. In his Rasabout dissent, Justice Lee considered, and rejected,
the suggestion that statutory language should be interpreted in the context
of other statutory language. The Rasabout majority criticized Lee’s use of
a corpus containing no statutory text for excluding the “the only speaker
that matters,” that is, the legislature.297 Lee responded that the text of the
Utah Code was not an appropriate corpus for determining the meaning of a
term in the Utah Code.298 Lee’s response suggests that the acontextuality
of searching a general corpus for statutory language is purposeful rather
than an oversight.
VI. CONCLUSION
The dream of objectivity has driven the adoption of corpus linguistics
techniques by commentators and a growing number of judges. The timing
of this move is not surprising. One reason is obvious: technological
advances have made corpus linguistics methods accessible to legal
interpreters without specialized linguistics training. But, there is another
reason why courts and commentators have been quick to adopt this new
methodology. The American legal profession, by many accounts, is
turning self-consciously toward formalism. As legal interpreters seek to
296
For more on context, corpus linguistics, and ordinary meaning, see Slocum, supra
note 17, at 13. What should be most alarming to interpreters considering a general corpus
for statutory interpretation is the fact that it might contain language outside the context of
American English altogether. The NOW Corpus, for example, contains texts that come not
only from United States, but from markedly different linguistic communities, like India,
Nigeria, Singapore, Kenya, Pakistan, and the Philippines, among others. Although a corpus
user can exclude this data from a search, a default search in the NOW Corpus contains
language from these countries. Interpreting statutes by relying on corpus data that includes
English words used in foreign countries gives rise to significant democratic accountability
problems.
297
State v. Rasabout, 356 P.3d 1258, 1266 (Utah 2015).
298
Id. at 1287 (Lee, J., concurring).
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minimize their role—or the appearance of their role—in the interpretive
process, the search for an objective tool of interpretation becomes more
attractive. Seen in this light, the problem with corpus linguistics techniques
is not their subjectivity, which may well be an inevitable part of the
interpretive process, but the erroneous claim that they are superior because
of their objectivity. Corpus linguistics will continue to be appealing to
legal interpreters seeking to demonstrate their self-restraint; but its
proponents should take care not to dismiss traditional methods of statutory
interpretation, with all their warts, to chase a merely evanescent dream of
objectivity.

